Abstract
In this paper, we discuss the problem of the relationship between legal concepts and legal norms. We argue that one of the widespread theories of legal concepts, which we call ‘the embedding theory’, is false. The theory is based on the assumption that legal norms are central for any legal system and that each legal norm establishes an inferential link between a certain class of facts and a certain class of legal consequences. Alf Ross’s embedding theory was presented in his famous paper “Tu–Tu”. According to Ross, the sole function of legal concepts is to simplify normative information. Hence, the use of legal concepts may be a matter of convenience, rather than necessity. We criticize this approach mainly by pointing to the existence of so-called second order substantive concepts, which are not reducible to any determined set of conditional sentences (inferential links). In short, second order substantive concepts play the role of general standards, and general standards are used to provide flexibility for a particular legal system. In addition, general standards are ‘value loaded’, since they serve as a frame of reference for judges applying law to particular cases. To understand such general standards as a predefined set of conditionals means to overlook their ‘open’ content, and thus their function. In our opinion, the acceptance of the embedding theory means to misinterpret the function of general standards. We also argue that Giovani Sartor’s idea of defective legal concepts doesn’t help to clarify or defend the embedding theory.
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For example, if legal rule (an inferential link) is an ordered pair <F, C>, an intermediate legal concept (ILC) would be a particular set of such pairs and the law a set of all such ordered pairs.
The position of Ross was criticized by G. Sartor, who maintains that the possibility of elimination does not support the thesis that legal concepts are deprived of meaning.
On the distinction of basic and non basic legal concepts see [2].
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Gizbert-Studnicki, T., Klinowski, M. Are Legal Concepts Embedded in Legal Norms?. Int J Semiot Law 25, 553–562 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9238-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9238-5