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Structure and evolution of co-authorship network in an interdisciplinary research field

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Abstract

The structure and evolution of co-authorship networks have been extensively studied in literature. However, the studies on the co-authorship network in a specific interdisciplinary field may be complementary to the mainstream of existing works. In this paper, the interdisciplinary field of “evolution of cooperation”, which has been prevalent in the last decades as a promising scientific frontier, is analyzed by extracting its co-authorship network mainly from Web of Science. The results show that the development of this field is characterized by the growth of a giant component of its collaboration network. Originally formed by assembling a few local clusters, the giant component has gradually evolved from a small cluster to a structure of “chained-communities”, and then to a small-world structure. Through examining the degree distributions and analyzing the vulnerability, we uncover that the giant component is comprised of the “elite”, the “middle-class” and the “grassroots”, with respect to the nodes’ degrees and their functions in structuring the giant component. Furthermore, the elite and the middle-class constitute a robust cohesive-core, which underpins the modular network of the giant component. The overall results of this work may illuminate more endeavors on the collaboration network in other interdisciplinary fields.

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Acknowledgments

This work is partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71371040 and 71401024, respectively. The comments from the anonymous reviewers are cordially appreciated, which are of great help to improve the quality and presentation of the paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, 116024, Liaoning Province, China

    Peng Liu & Haoxiang Xia

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  1. Peng Liu
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Correspondence to Haoxiang Xia.

Appendix

Appendix

The basic information of communities in the giant component during typical periods.

In the following table, we list the communities and their major topical and belonging authors for the communities identified in the years of 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2010, as discussed in the subsection “correlating network evolution with field growth”. To avoid the table to be verbosely long, we just select the top 10 for the topical terms in each community and the top 30 for the authors, given that the community is with more topical-terms and more authors.

Period

Community

Major topical terms (top 10 in terms of the occurrence frequency)

Authors with (top 30 in terms of author degree)

ID

Size

Number of papers

1961–2002

12

12

22

Public goods game; iterated prisoner’s dilemma (ipd); strategy; spatial game; indirect reciprocity; heterogeneous population; agent-based simulation; tit for tat; social insect; reactive strategies

Nowak, M.; Sigmund, K.; Hauert, C.; May, R.M.; De monte, S.; Hofbauer, J.; Bohoeffer, S.; Page, K.M.; Krebs, J.; Schuster, H.G.; Wahl, L.M.; Stenull, O.

190

21

20

Group selection; strategy; tit for tat; game theory (theory); altruism; reciprocal altruism; unrelated individual; population structure; iterated prisoner’s dilemma (ipd); genetic kinship

Dugatkin, L.A.; Crowley, P.H.; Wilson, D.S.; Alfieri, M.; Sargent, R.C.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Cottrell, T.; Garcia, T.; Hatch, M.; Stokes, B.J.; White, J.M.; Farrand, L.; Wilkens, R.T.; Mestertongibbons, M.; Pollock, G.B.; Houston, A.I.; Sober, E.; Mitteldorf, J.

239

7

1

Selfish; finite population;

Clutton-brock, T.H.; O’riain, M.J.; Brotherton, P.N.M.; Gaynor, D.; Kansky, R.; Griffin, A.S.; Manser, M.

270

7

4

Social exchange theory; evolutionary psychology; cognition; task; social contracts; selection; role; relevance; reciprocation; game theory (theory)

Cosmides, L.; Tooby, J.; Stone, V.E.; Kroll, N.; Knight, R.T.; Fiddick, L.; Sugiyama, L.S.

342

7

10

Indirect reciprocity; reputation; human; image scoring; prisoner’s dilemma; tit for tat; direct reciprocity; strategy; public goods game; human cooperation

Milinski, M.; Semmann, D.; Bakker, T.C.M.; Krambeck, H.J.; Wedekind, C.; Kulling, D.; Braithwaite, V.A.

313

5

2

Costly signaling; human; strategy; signaling theory; strong reciprocity; social interaction; hunting; human behavioral ecology; handicap models; finite population

Smith, E.A.; Gintis, H.; Bowles, S.; Bird, R.B.; Bird, D.W.

35

3

3

Kin-selection; social relationship; reciprocal altruism; grooming; vervet monkey; social organization; reciprocity; primate group; papio cynocephalus ursinus; genetic kinship

Seyfarth, R.M.; Cheney, D.L.; Silk, J.B.

261

3

2

Social norm; human; strong reciprocity; punishment; human cooperation; altruistic punishment; game theory (theory); finite population; enforcement

Fehr, E.; Gachter, S.; Fischbacher, U.

137

3

2

Indirect reciprocity; image scoring; good standing; finite population; direct reciprocity

Leimar, O.; Enquist, M.; Hammerstein, P.

1961–2003

375

39

38

Human; indirect reciprocity; reputation; tit for tat; image scoring; social exchange theory; punishment; social norm; coalition; reciprocal altruism

Fehr, E.; Tooby, J.; Clutton-brock, T.H.; Milinski, M.; Silk, J.B.; Hammerstein, P.; Hagen, E.H.; Mcelreath, R.; Fessler, D.M.T.; Kosfeld, M.; Wilson, M.I.; Cosmides, L.; O’riain, M.J.; Brotherton, P.N.M.; Gaynor, D.; Kansky, R.; Griffin, A.S.; Manser, M.; Stone, V.E.; Kroll, N.; Knight, R.T.; Leimar, O.; Semmann, D.; Bakker, T.C.M.; Krambeck, H.J.; Seyfarth, R.M.; Cheney, D.L.; Connor, R.C.; Wedekind, C.; Gachter, S.

376

30

38

Human; public goods game; punishment; prisoner’s dilemma; indirect reciprocity; costly signaling; strategy; spatial game; iterated prisoner’s dilemma (ipd); reputation

Sigmund, K.; Bowles, S.; Smith, E.A.; Richerson, P.J.; Young, H.P.; Hopfensitz, A.; Henrich, J.; Boyd, R.T.; Weissing, F.J.; Boyd, R.; Hauert, C.; Nowak, M.; Gintis, H.; May, R.M.; De monte, S.; Hofbauer, J.; Bohoeffer, S.; Schuster, H.G.; Page, K.M.; Bird, R.B.; Bird, D.W.; Choi, J.K.; Brandt, H.; Krebs, J.; Richerson, P.; Foster, D.; Wahl, L.M.; Stenull, O.; Traulsen, A.; Panchanathan, K.

1961–2004

365

52

49

Human; reputation; social norm; indirect reciprocity; punishment; tit for tat; reciprocity; kin-selection; image scoring; human cooperation

Fehr, E.; Silk, J.B.; Tooby, J.; Clutton-brock, T.H.; Milinski, M.; Hammerstein, P.; Hagen, E.H.; Mcelreath, R.; Fessler, D.M.T.; Kosfeld, M.; Wilson, M.I.; Griffin, A.S.; Fischbacher, U.; Cosmides, L.; O’riain, M.J.; Brotherton, P.N.M.; Gaynor, D.; Kansky, R.; Manser, M.; De quervain, D.J.F.; Treyer, V.; Schelthammer, M.; Schnyder, U.; Buck, A.; Stone, V.E.; Kroll, N.; Knight, R.T.; Leimar, O.; Semmann, D.; Bakker, T.C.M.

366

46

56

Human; evolutionarily stable strategy; prisoner’s dilemma; indirect reciprocity; public goods game; punishment; continuous prisoner’s dilemma; spatial game; heterogeneous population; direct reciprocity

Sigmund, K.; Bowles, S.; Smith, E.A.; Richerson, P.J.; Young, H.P.; Hauert, C.; Hopfensitz, A.; Henrich, J.; Boyd, R.T.; Weissing, F.J.; Nowak, M.; Boyd, R.; Killingback, T.; Mueller, U.G.; Bull, J.J.; Doebeli, M.; Knowlton, N.; De monte, S.; Hofbauer, J.; Herre, E.A.; Rehner, S.A.; Sachs, J.L.; Wilcox, T.P.; May, R.M.; Schuster, H.G.; Bird, R.B.; Bird, D.W.; Traulsen, A.; Choi, J.K.

93

17

31

Indirect reciprocity; prisoner’s dilemma; finite population; reputation; strategy; repeated game; learning theory; group selection; evolution of altruism; defector

Matsuda, H.; Yamamura, N.; Sasaki, A.; Ogita, N.; Fudenberg, D.; Nakamaru, M.; Iwasa, Y.; Tamachi, N.; Sato, K.; Taylor, C.; Nogami, H.; Maskin, E.; Higashi, M.; Kawata, M.; Wakano, J.Y.; Kobayashi, Y.; Ohtsuki, H.

1961–2010

172

36

41

Tit for tat; altruism; group selection; game theory (theory); strategy; reciprocal altruism; evolutionarily stable strategy; mutualism; punishment; prisoner’s dilemma

Crowley, P.H.; Dugatkin, L.A.; Wilson, D.S.; Houston, A.I.; Mcnamara, J.M.; Alfieri, M.; Sargent, R.C.; Provencher, L.; Sloane, S.; Spohn, B.; Rogers, L.; Cottrell, T.; Garcia, T.; Hatch, M.; Stokes, B.J.; White, J.M.; Leimar, O.; Farrand, L.; Wilkens, R.T.; Dall, S.R.X.; Barta, Z.; Fromhage, L.; Stephens, P.A.; Mestertongibbons, M.; Pollock, G.B.; Connor, R.C.; O’gorman, R.; Miller, R.R.; Eldakar, O.T.; Farrell, D.L.

387

162

216

Evolutionary game theory; prisoner’s dilemma; public goods game; network; evolutionarily stable strategy; indirect reciprocity; direct reciprocity; punishment; finite population; spatial game

Nowak, M.; Wang, Long; Traulsen, A.; Sigmund, K.; Hauert, C.; Ohtsuki, H.; Fu, Feng; Pacheco, J.M.; Iwasa, Y.; Chen, Xiaojie; Santos, F.C.; Killingback, T.; Taborsky, M.; Rand, D.G.; Fudenberg, D.; Nakamaru, M.; Doebeli, M.; Pfeiffer, T.; Chu, Tianguang; Dreber, A.; Matsuda, H.; Hauser, M.; Taylor, P.D.; Xie, Guangming; Wu, Bin; Yamamura, N.; Bull, J.J.; Sasaki, A.; Mueller, U.G.; Brandt, H.

441

16

31

Prisoner’s dilemma; public goods game; punishment; network; evolutionarily stable strategy; noise; graph theory; social dilemma; scale free network; impact

Szolnoki, A.; Szabo, G.; Perc, M.; Helbing, D.; Wang, Zhen; Xu, Zhaojin; Zhang, Lianzhong; Stark, H.U.; Huang Jianhua; Song, Hongpeng; Vukov, J.; Danku, Z.; Fath, G.; Yu, Wenjian; Chadefaux, T.; Johansson, A.

453

11

11

Punishment; social network; human; public goods game; network; dictator game; cooperative behavior; experimental economics; collective action; game theory (theory)

Fowler, J.H.; Dawes, C.T.; Johannesson, M.; Wallace, B.; Cesarini, D.; Lichtenstein, P.; Johnson, T.; Smirnov, O.; Christakis, N.A.; Persson, B.; Kam, C.D.

533

32

24

Punishment; altruism; strong reciprocity; population structure; kin-selection; human; group selection; genetic and cultural evolution of cooperation; evolution of altruism; biofilm

Thompson, C.R.L.; Feldman, M.W.; Foster, K.R.; Santorelli, L.A.; Villegas, E.; Svetz, J.; Dinh, C.; Parikh, A.; Sucgang, R.; Kuspa, A.; Strassmann, J.E.; Queller, D.C.; Shaulsky, G.; Lehmann, L.; Rousset, F.; Roze, D.; Borenstein, E.; Aoki, K.; Cavallisforza, L.L.; Peck, J.R.; Kerr, B.; Godfrey-smith, P.; Ratnieks, F.L.W.; Kendal, J.; Wenseleers, T.; Parkinson, K.; Ravigne, V.; Nadell, C.D.; Xavier, J.B.; Thomas, E.A.C.

556

6

4

Punishment; human; social norm; human cooperation; strong reciprocity; gene-culture coevolution; experiment; antisocial punishment; societies; reciprocity

Gachter, S.; Herrmann, B.; Renner, E.; Sefton, M.; Thoeni, C.; Gaechter, S.

572

39

31

Human; public goods game; kin-selection; altruism; punishment; siderophore; inclusive fitness; strong reciprocity; hamilton’s rule; competition

Griffin, A.S.; West, S.A.; Gardner, A.; Keller, L.; Kuemmerli, R.; Buckling, A.; Harrison, F.; Shuker, D.M.; Reynolds, T.; Burton-chellow, M.; Sykes, E.M.; Guinnee, M.A.; Brockhurst, M.A.; O’riain, M.J.; Brotherton, P.N.M.; Gaynor, D.; Kansky, R.; Manser, M.; Vos, M.; Racey, D.; Colliard, C.; Fiechter, N.; Petitpierre, B.; Russier, F.; Floreano, D.; Langer, P.; Van den berg, P.; Inglis, R.F.; Oliver, A.; Perez-uribe, A.

620

137

143

Human; punishment; reputation; public goods game; evolutionary stable strategy; indirect reciprocity; altruistic punishment; social norm; altruism; strong reciprocity

Fehr, E.; Mcelreath, R.; Henrich, J.; Gurven, M.; Bowles, S.; Hill, K.; Silk, J.B.; Marlowe, F.W.; Barr, A.; Ensminger, J.; Henrich, N.S.; Tracer, D.; Milinski, M.; Boyd, R.; Tooby, J.; Gintis, H.; Clutton-brock, T.H.; Alvard, M.S.; Camerer, C.; Gil-white, F.; Patton, J.Q.; Richerson, P.J.; Ziker, J.; Barrett, C.; Bolyanatz, A.; Cardenas, J.C.; Gwako, E.; Lesorogol, C.; Hammerstein, P.; Fischbacher, U.

633

32

21

Chimpanzee; punishment; public goods game; prisoner’s dilemma; image scoring; ultimatum game; social network; smiling; network; laughter

Dunbar, R.I.M.; Johnson, D.D.P.; Melis, A.P.; Hare, B.; Madsen, E.A.; Tunney, R.J.; Fieldman, G.; Plotkin, H.C.; Richardson, J.M.; Mcfarland, D.; Tomasello, M.; Call, J.; Woods, V.; Hastings, S.; Wrangham, R.; Mcdermott, R.; Tingley, D.; Cowden, J.; Frazzetto, G.; Jensen, H.J.; Marriott, A.; Duncan, N.D.C.; Stopka, P.; Bell, J.; Stopka, P.; Macdonald, D.W.; Burnham, T.C.; Russell, Y.I.; Fedurek, P.; Kudo, H.

764

4

2

Social preference; neural; finite population; evidence

Camerer, C.F.; Tricomi, E.; Rangel, A.; O’doherty, J.P.

773

27

36

Mutualism; indirect reciprocity; altruism; punishment; evolutionary stable strategy; interaction; cleaner fish; partner control; kin-selection; image scoring

Bshary, R.; Noe, R.; Wright, J.; Hamilton, I.M.; Palmer, C.T.; Wright, S.A.; Cassidy, C.; Vanpool, T.L.; Coe, K.; Bergmueller, R.; Johnstone, R.A.; Russell, A.F.; Voelkl, B.; Heg, D.; Fruteau, C.; Van damme, E.; Jutzeler, E.; Mitchell, J.S.; Schuerch, R.; Vanschaik, C.P.; Vanhooff, J.; Grutter, A.S.; Raihani, N.J.; Bronstein, J.L.; Cant, M.A.; Kasper, C.; Bshary, A.

774

5

2

Social relationship; reciprocal altruism; grooming; baboon; vervet monkey; social organization; papio cynocephalus ursinus; kin-selection; finite population; female social relationships

Seyfarth, R.M.; Cheney, D.L.; Moscovice, L.R.; Heesen, M.; Mundry, R.

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Liu, P., Xia, H. Structure and evolution of co-authorship network in an interdisciplinary research field. Scientometrics 103, 101–134 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-014-1525-y

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