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An Analysis of the Ontological Causal Relation in Physics and Its Educational Implications

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Abstract

An ontological causal relation is a quantified relation between certain interactions and changes in corresponding properties. Key ideas in physics, such as Newton’s second law and the first law of thermodynamics, are representative examples of these relations. In connection with the teaching and learning of these relations, this study investigated three issues: the appropriate view concerning ontological category, the role and status of ontological causal relations, and university students’ understanding of the role and status of these relations. Concerning the issue of proper ontology, this study suggests an alternative view that distinguishes between interaction and property at the macroscopic level, in contrast to Chi and colleagues’ influential view. Concerning the role and status of the relations, we conclude that fundamental ontological causal relations should be regarded as knowledge at the core of relevant physics theories. However, upon analysis of participants’ responses, this study finds that university students’ views on the status of the heat capacity relation and Newton’s second law are quite different. Several possible educational implications of these results are discussed.

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Notes

  1. See Sect. 2 for a more detailed explanation of this term.

  2. For more on this issue, see Bunge (2000).

  3. For instance, Halloun (1996), Hestenes (1997), Arons (1997), Reiner et al. (2000), and Etkina et al. (2006).

  4. The term interaction is not always used within the frame of ontological category. For instance, in the context of quantum mechanics, nonzero off-diagonal terms in the matrix representation of Hamiltonian are considered to be interaction terms. In the basis that diagonalizes the matrix, interaction terms disappear. This usage of the term interaction is beyond the division of property and interaction. In this sense, learning quantum mechanics or other advanced topics require freedom from strict division between property and interaction.

  5. In the context of a system of many bodies, F and a in Newton’s second law should be net (external) force and acceleration of center of mass, respectively. Therefore, a causal structure still underlies the Newton’s second law of many bodies. This point deserves passing notice. One reviewer claimed that an Atwood machine could show the problem with a causality interpretation of Newton’s second law by mentioning Coelho’s (2013) work. In the article, Coelho claimed that the “force as cause of acceleration” interpretation was not well matched to the Atwood machine. For an ideal Atwood machine, the formula Mg − mg = (M + m)a is easily derived where M and m are the masses of objects composing the Atwood machine and a is the acceleration of an object. Coelho discussed the difficulty in interpreting the formula within the “force as cause of acceleration” interpretation. However, note that the left term in the formula Mg − mg is not a net force on the Atwood machine since the net force is composed of contact force on the center of a wheel (4Mmg/(M + m)) and gravitational force (−Mg − mg). Besides, in the right term, a is not acceleration of center of mass. Thus, in our view, the issue of the “force as cause of acceleration” interpretation for the formula Mg − mg = (M + m)a concerning the Atwood machine is not a reason to discount the ontological causality-interpretation of Newton’s second law.

  6. Chi et al.’s terminology concerning the constraint-based interaction category and elaborated meaning of the category have frequently changed in their later research. However, such modification is not related to our point of argument in the following.

  7. For instance, Slotta and Chi (2006, pp. 286–287) asserted that: “Our research suggests that instruction should stress the basic ontological characteristics of the concepts, targeting students’ existing conceptions indirectly by carefully avoiding any language, analogies, or phenomenon that might otherwise reinforce the substance-based view.”

  8. One reviewer pointed out that, historically, Planck and Herz had criticized the concept of energy as a substance. An idea that X is a kind of substance is different from the material metaphor of X since X is not a substance in the latter. A material metaphor for X could be useful even though X is not a substance.

  9. We note that discussions concerning the distinction of property and interaction are also found in Chi and her colleague’s works. However, in these works, the distinction is secondary.

  10. This is not the only well-known definition of heat. See Slisko and Dykstra (1997) and Romer (2001) regarding possible confusion concerning the definition of heat.

  11. The material metaphor of energy could be powerful as it is well matched with the idea of “energy conservation.” In the context of energy conservation in an isolated system, an increase in energy in one subsystem always accompanies a decrease in the same amount of energy in the other subsystem. Thus, we can metaphorically say that energy moves from one subsystem to the other subsystem, although energy is not a concrete thing and it does not belong to the matter category. In an extension of this reasoning, we can conclude that a property quantity could be metaphorically treated as material if the quantity is conserved (Cheong and Song 2011).

  12. Poincare (1905), Eisenbud (1958), Weinstock (1961), Nagel (1961), Lakatos (1980), and Losee (2001).

  13. This collective nature of theory test is relevant to the Duhem–Quine thesis.

  14. Note that we do not argue that any demonstration of Newton’s second law that utilizes a force sensor or spring scale should be removed from instruction. Instead, it is our point that such kinds of experiments should be treated as a demonstration instead of an experimental proof in instruction. Discussion on effective demonstrations and detailed sequences introducing fundamental laws of motion to students is beyond the scope of this study. Interested readers could see, for instance, Eisenbud (1958), Weinstock (1961), and Arons (1997).

  15. Heat can be inferred from other OC relations such as \(Q = Lm\), where L is latent heat and m is the mass of the sample material that undergoes a phase change. Conclusively, amount of heat is calculated from measurement outcomes concerning change in temperature or mass of a sample in phase transition.

  16. Scientific knowledge can include both methodological knowledge and conceptual knowledge. Here, we use the term scientific knowledge to refer to conceptual knowledge.

  17. See, for instance, Tseitlin and Galili’s work (2005) for a broad account of physics education based on the analysis of the structure of physics theory.

  18. Critical consideration of the meaning of the term law is more relevant to the philosophy of science than to science itself. The meaning of the term changes in accordance with changes in the recognition of the nature of scientific knowledge.

  19. The disagreement is not surprising because historically there has not been a distinction between law and theory. Dilworth (2006) credits Campbell (1952) as the first advocator of the distinction. However, there are still critics of the distinction. One position against the distinction asserted that theories are not complementary to laws but are more inclusive clusters of knowledge elements.

  20. For instance, see also Nagel (1961), Carnap (1966), Hempel (1966), and Dilworth (2006).

  21. The exact wording of the question given to students was, for instance, “Is the following relation (first law of thermodynamics [\(W + Q = \Delta E_{\text{int}}\)]) closer to being an observed or inferred relation? Explain your reason for your choice. If you have any difficulty in making a choice, describe it.” The words observed and inferred were utilized instead of (empirical) law and theory. The term law was avoided because of the confusion about the usage of the term.

  22. All the excerpts of students’ responses given to this article were translated into English from Korean by the authors.

  23. Note that the number of participants for this case was smaller than 55 participants who responded to the questions concerning heat. This was because Newton’s second law was only discussed in class for 2 years, in 2014 and 2015, in contrast to the other OC relations.

  24. Many students simply regarded heat as a measured quantity without considering the measuring method for heat. In the group discussion that followed the questionnaire, many of them demonstrated difficulty in providing a concrete way of measuring heat. A few students suggested that the amount of heat could be measured by measuring “heating time” (time in which an object is in contact with the thermal reservoir). However, in this case, the amount of heat is not only a function of heating time but also the temperature difference between the object and the thermal reservoir. Thus, heating time alone is not a valid pointer for the measurement of heat. Precise determination of the amount of heat requires use of OC relations such as the heat capacity relation.

  25. It is hard to find a discussion on the role and status of OC relations in popular textbooks used in introductory physics courses. In the case of intermediate mechanics textbooks, we found that the role and status of Newton’s second law was briefly discussed in the introductory part of the textbooks. On the other hand, we did not find any discussion on the role and status of the first law of thermodynamics in two popular thermal and statistical physics textbooks for standard undergraduate courses.

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Cheong, Y.W. An Analysis of the Ontological Causal Relation in Physics and Its Educational Implications. Sci & Educ 25, 611–628 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-016-9835-5

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