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Reconsideration of the Paradox of Inquiry

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Abstract

It is well known that the Meno presents the argument called “the paradox of inquiry.” This paper has two purposes. First, I analyze the paradox of inquiry and reformulate the argument as the “renewed paradox of inquiry.” Second, I clarify that the problem of inquiry posed by this paradox concerns the necessary conditions for a novice learner to learn to begin and advance an inquiry on her own. This problem of inquiry will be important to address even today in considering scientific and educational practice related to inquiry.

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Notes

  1. Day (1994) provides us with a general introduction to the paradox of inquiry and a clear overview of the argument concerning it. In addition, concerning inquiry, White (1974) explores various wider implications of the paradox, beyond its particular interest in Plato.

  2. In this paper, I keep away from exegetical issues of the Meno except for those obtained from exegetical research, such as Scott (2006): significant and relevant knowledge that enables us to clarify the argument of the paradox. With regard to the paradox of inquiry in Plato’s philosophy, Scott comments that, “First, it has proved very difficult for scholars to agree on what the problem behind the ‘paradox’ actually is. Second, there is the question of whether Meno uses the challenge merely as a dodge to evade further cross-examination, or whether he is motivated by a serious philosophical concern” (ibid., p. 75).

  3. With regard to Plato’s work, the following standard title is used throughout (1997). I alter some terms to make them suitable for contexts of the argument in this paper.

  4. Fine draws the following three questions from the Meno: “(a) How can one inquire into something if one doesn’t at all know what it is? (b) Which of the things one doesn’t know is one inquiring into? (c) How will one recognize the object of one’s inquiry, even if one finds it?” (Fine 1992, p. 205).

  5. This kind of inquiry is sometimes called an “interrogative model of inquiry” (Hintikka 2007, p. 18).

  6. Given that getting to know new information is discussed in this context, “learn” and “discover” could both be used here. It may be better, however, to use “learning” when, by contrast with teaching, it is emphasized that inquiry is not merely discovering but getting to know by our inquiry.

  7. This stipulation might trigger the problem of the definition of knowledge, that is, whether the stipulation is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. I do not address this problem because this argument primarily focuses on inquiry as one of the channels for obtaining knowledge. See, for example, Baehr (2012) concerning the relationship between inquiry and knowledge in contemporary epistemology.

  8. With regard to the flow of the argument in the Meno, from ethical problems of virtue to the problems of our inquiry, Ryle comments that, “there is a major deficit in its [Meno’s] philosophical plot. At 80D, without the slightest pertinence to the ethical subject under discussion, Meno deploys the quite tricky epistemological sophism that enquiry of any sort must be vain” (Ryle 1976, p. 3, square bracket added).

  9. With regard to interpretation of the relation between the argument of Meno’s challenge and that of the paradox of inquiry, there is some controversy (Scott 2006, p. 5). In this paper, I avoid this exegetical issue and utilize the argument of Meno’s challenge to clarify the presuppositions on which the argument of the paradox of inquiry is probably based.

  10. This formulation is referred to in Scott (2006, p. 78).

  11. Although he replies to Meno that he can tell why the argument is flawed, Socrates does not make explicit a point that he thinks is a flaw in the argument of the paradox (Meno 81a1–81A2). See Scott (2006, pp. 81–82) in detail.

  12. Let us note that there are some ambiguities concerning learning what is relevant to a problem. For example, what are the things that are relevant to a problem? To what extent does a learner have to learn what is relevant to a problem in order to be able to inquire? I do not address these problems because these considerations will diverge from the theme of the paradox of inquiry, although these will be important problems after this article. See Scheffler (1973, pp. 126–135) for the relationship between education of relevance and inquiry.

  13. Ohkusa (2003, pp. 52–55) argues that the process of answering questions, encompassing giving incorrect answers, is probably that of recollection.

  14. Scott argues that “Socrates hopes that the theory of recollection can help solve the problem of discovery, a problem caused by in part by his commitment to the foreknowledge principle, which demands that any successful inquiry must start out from pre-existent knowledge” (Scott 2006, p. 106).

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Acknowledgments

Discussions with anonymous reviewers have been illuminating. This work was supported by Grant in Aid in Research Fellow for Young Scientist by College of Humanities and Sciences at Nihon University.

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Correspondence to Kunimasa Sato.

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Sato, K. Reconsideration of the Paradox of Inquiry. Sci & Educ 23, 987–995 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-013-9597-2

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