Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

, Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 51–80

Deterring domestic violence: Do criminal sanctions reduce repeat offenses?


    • Department of EconomicsDuke University
  • Alyssa C. Platt
    • Duke Global Health & Department of Biostatics and BioinformaticsDuke University
  • Lindsey M. Chepke
    • Department of EconomicsDuke University
  • Claire E. Blevins
    • Clinical Psychology DepartmentVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

DOI: 10.1007/s11166-012-9159-z

Cite this article as:
Sloan, F.A., Platt, A.C., Chepke, L.M. et al. J Risk Uncertain (2013) 46: 51. doi:10.1007/s11166-012-9159-z


This study presents an empirical analysis of domestic violence case resolution in North Carolina for the years 2004 to 2010. The key hypothesis is that penalties at the level set for domestic violence crimes reduce recidivism (re-arrest on domestic violence charges or conviction in 2 years following an index arrest). We use state court data for all domestic violence-related arrests. Decisions to commit an act of domestic violence are based on a Bayesian process of updating subjective beliefs. Individuals have prior beliefs about penalties for domestic violence based on actual practice in their areas. An individual’s experience with an index arrest leads to belief updating. To address endogeneity of case outcomes, we use an instrumental variables strategy based on decisions of prosecutors and judges assigned to each index arrest in our sample. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that penalities, at least as set at the current levels, do not deter future arrests and convictions.


CrimeDomestic violenceDeterrenceSubjective beliefsProsecutorsJudges

JEL Classification


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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013