Abstract
Although forgiveness is often taken to bear a close connection to the value of reconciliation, there is a good deal of scepticism about its role in situations where there is no consensus on the moral complexion of the past and no admission of guilt on the part of the perpetrator. This scepticism is typically rooted in the claims that forgiveness without perpetrator acknowledgement (1) aggravates the risk of recidivism; (2) yields a substandard and morally compromised form of political accommodation; and (3) comes across as patronizing and offensive to the recipient, thereby causing further alienation. In this article, my aim is to show, firstly, that none of these arguments is decisive and, secondly, that forgiveness is a suitable object of political concern in the absence of cross-community consensus on the rights and wrongs of a conflict. In this way, I aim to demonstrate that forgiveness deserves to be taken seriously as a means to civic reconciliation in a broader range of situations than many have allowed.
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Notes
Forgiveness is said to be ‘unilateral’ if it is granted independently of—and prior to—any acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the recipient. See, for instance, Govier (2002, p. 62). Some philosophers tend to use the term ‘unconditional forgiveness’ to mean much the same thing. However, I prefer to avoid this phrase because it encourages the mistaken thought that the only form of conditionality that might be relevant to the justification of forgiveness is the wrongdoer’s attitude towards the offence. It is one of the points of this paper that there are ‘forward-looking’ conditions that bear on the justification of forgiveness which aren’t tied to perpetrator acknowledgement or repentance.
For some general discussions of the ethical status of unilateral forgiveness, see Bennett (2003b), Garrard and McNaughton (2003), Griswold (2007), Haber (1991), Holmgren (1993), Pettigrove (2004) and Watkins (2009).
Here I echo Govier (2008, p. 229).
For an influential specification of the concept of a modus vivendi, see Rawls (1993, p. 147).
On my definition, forgiveness in its fullest sense is undeniably a difficult stance to achieve. However, implicit in the definition is a contrast between complete and incomplete forgiveness. A person might be said to have shown forgiveness, albeit to an incomplete degree, if they have taken certain steps towards ‘drawing a line under the offence’, even if a residue of hostility remains.
A further caveat: the attitudes and intentions that are founded on the belief that one has been wronged need not be the same as the attitudes and intentions that are founded on the belief that one has been harmed, even though the beliefs may relate to the very same incident. Forgiveness, on my account, typically requires overcoming emotions such as resentment and anger but not emotions such as disappointment and regret.
A similar worry about compromise is in evidence in Minow (1998, p. 16).
The other version of the argument emphasizes the message which forgiveness sends to the unrepentant wrongdoer. This seems to be the line of thought that is uppermost in Griswold’s mind. Although he recognizes that logically-speaking forgiveness isn’t the same as approval or condonation, he worries that this is how it will come across to those who are unrepentant. As he explains (Griswold 2007, pp. 64–65): ‘[t]he victim may subjectively feel that she is not overlooking the wrong done; but if the forgiveness is unconditional…the offender is very likely to draw the conclusion that her wrongdoing has been condoned.’
I find this unconvincing, at least in many cases. Indeed the force of the Alienation Argument depends precisely on the fact that unrepentant perpetrators generally don’t draw the conclusion that their conduct is being condoned: this is why they may find forgiveness insulting.
Notwithstanding the shift to the ‘large-scale’, I am, for present purposes, still thinking of forgiveness as a stance which one person takes up towards another. As such, I am remaining agnostic on the question of whether governments or states can forgive.
To the best of my knowledge, no existing written constitution makes explicit reference to forgiveness. The 1994 South African constitution treats ‘national healing’ as a basic value.
In 2006, the UK government established the Consultative Group on the Past to address the legacy of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The resulting report placed considerable emphasis on the need for forgiveness. See Consultative Group on the Past (2009, esp. pp. 54–56).
Famously, Tutu used his position as chair of the TRC to encourage forgiveness.
Although Tutu has reservations about a policy of ‘national amnesia’, I borrow the phrase from him. See Tutu (2000, ch. 2).
For a helpful discussion of restorative justice and its relation to forgiveness, see Johnstone (2013, pp. 132–135).
For a sceptical discussion of the empirical effectiveness of restorative justice conferences in promoting forgiveness, see Van Stokkom (2008).
Here I echo MacLachlan (2012, pp. 48–51), who enlists this point to respond to the ‘illiberalism objection’.
Digeser responds to the ‘soulcraft’ objection by divorcing forgiveness from feelings such as resentment and anger and defining it entirely in terms of outward behaviour. By eschewing a ‘sentiment-based’ model of forgiveness, he thinks it is possible to sidestep the objection. My own view is that it is possible to sidestep the objection without even redefining the terms.
Nor is it a conception of politics which is in evidence in liberal law-making. By including a ‘mens rea’ element in the definition of almost all crimes, liberal states pay some attention to the ‘inner’ aspects of human existence. On this point, see Pettigrove and Parsons (2010, p. 665).
For a related set of observations, see Griswold (2007, p. 139). Griswold thinks that the multiplicity of different perspectives that exist in the public realm casts doubt on the very idea of ‘public’ or ‘political’ forgiveness. Although I don’t have the time to discuss this point adequately, it is interesting to note that it is rooted in the same facts that underpin the charge of partisanship.
In recommending this strategy, my position bears some comparison with the approach recommended in Smith (2012, pp. 48–51). However, Smith tends to see this as a non-political, ‘bottom up’ approach which emerges from the grass roots initiatives of private individuals whereas I see it as an approach that can be orchestrated by the state.
This kind of view finds expression, for example, in Consultative Group on the Past (2009). This report is unambiguous in its rejection of unilateral forgiveness, insisting that ‘[i]t is simply not possible to complete an act of forgiveness unless a wrong is acknowledged’ (Consultative Group on the Past 2009, p. 54). Instead it places considerable faith in the capacity of the different communities to reach a consensus on the past through a process of dialogue and truth-recovery, stating that, ‘[a]s cross-community story-telling and other forms of memorialisation proceed, it is quite possible the overall futility of recourse to arms to solve the problems of a divided Northern Ireland might begin to dawn on those who took part’ (Consultative Group on the Past 2009, p. 55).
The Provisional IRA, for example, issued an apology to all of its ‘non-combatant’ victims in 2002.
I therefore agree with Biggar (2008, p. 568), that ‘[i]f there is to be any measure of reconciliation in Northern Ireland, it will be the reconciliation of partisans. Reconciliation will have to happen between those who continue to disagree about what caused the Troubles and about who is basically to blame for them.’
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Acknowledgments
In preparing this article, I have greatly benefitted from the helpful and constructive suggestions made by two anonymous referees. I would also like to thank Chris Cowley for commenting on an earlier draft of the article and the participants at the AHRC Care for the Future workshop, held at Queen’s University Belfast in May 2013, for their incisive feedback.
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Watkins, J. Unilateral Forgiveness and the Task of Reconciliation. Res Publica 21, 19–42 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-014-9256-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-014-9256-8