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Neo-Aristotelian Social Justice: An Unanswered Question

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Abstract

In this paper I assess the possibility of advancing a modern conception of social justice under neo-Aristotelian lights, focussing primarily on conceptions that assert a fundamental connection between social justice and eudaimonia. After some preliminary remarks on the extent to which a neo-Aristotelian account must stay close to Aristotle’s own, I focus on Martha Nussbaum’s sophisticated neo-Aristotelian approach, which I argue implausibly overworks the aspects of Aristotle’s thought it appeals to. I then outline the shape of a deeper and more general, and as yet unanswered, problem facing neo-Aristotelian accounts: how to justify the claim that the point of a just society is to assist or enable its members to flourish.

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Notes

  1. For excellent accounts of Aristotle’s own view can be found in (Annas 1996) and (Barnes 1990).

  2. See also NE 1142a8. I have used the revised translation by Hugh Tredennick: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, and Ernest Barker’s translation: Aristotle, Politics.

  3. It need not be virtuous agents either: witness Alasdair MacIntyre’s vision (MacIntyre 1999) of virtuous character writ large on communities of ‘reliable others’.

  4. Aristotle gives no clear indication how extensive the deficiency is: e.g. NE 1137b; 1141b23–29. Compare (Schofield 2006, p. 319).

  5. See also the direct appeals to globally held intuition at (Nussbaum 2006, p. 70, p. 78, and passim). See also (Nussbaum 1993, pp. 260–265), where Nussbaum moves straight from reflections on the grounds for intelligible interpretation of different cultural and ethical outlooks to the claim that there is some settled agreement about morally salient features of human beings.

  6. For more detail see (Prinz 2009); (Jackson 2011); (Wiredu 1996); and—relatedly, on disagreement over interpretations of nature—(Descola 1996).

  7. The late Tony Judt describes this strand of liberalism as follows: ‘liberalism… is necessarily indeterminate. It is not about some sort of liberal project for society; it is about a society in which the messiness and openness of politics precludes the application of large-scale projects, however rational and ideal—especially, indeed, if they are rational and ideal’ (Judt 2011, p. 315).

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Onora O’Neill, Rosalind Hursthouse, Adrian Haddock, and the late Amanda Perreau-Saussine, for helpful discussions on this topic over many years.

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  1. University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland, UK

    Simon Hope

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Hope, S. Neo-Aristotelian Social Justice: An Unanswered Question. Res Publica 19, 157–172 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-013-9213-y

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