Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals

  • Published:
Res Publica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. By moral standing I mean a being counts in its own right and by moral status I mean how a being is counted in comparison to others (cf. Buchanan 2009; Cohen 2007; Garner 2003b, 2006; Steinbock 2011).

  2. cf. DeGrazia (1996), Nussbaum (2004), Tucker and MacDonald (2004).

  3. Rowlands (2009) distinguishes Kantian and Hobbesian contractarianism, which have two major differences: (1) authority—the requirements that have to be adhered to for the contract to compel us to conform to it; (2) what grounds the authority. Kantian contractarianism is a means of getting at the truth. Similarly, Nussbaum (2004) refers to Rawls’ theory as a type of Kantian/contractarian theory.

  4. Elliot (1984) deals with this subject more fully. I argue (2011b) elsewhere that a Rawlsian theory can be appropriately applied to animals. It is the neo-Hobbesian account that concerns me here. Others discuss Rawlsian accounts of animals’ moral standing, e.g. Abbey (2007), Barry (1989, 1995), Cavalieri and Kymlicka (1996), Coeckelbergh (2009), Filice (2006), Fuchs (1981), Garner (2003a, 2005, 2012a, b), Nussbaum (2004), Richards (1971), Regan (1981), Rowlands (1997, 2002, 2009), Russow (1992), VanDeVeer (1983).

  5. E.g. Carruthers (1992), Garner (2012b), Sandoe and Christiansen (2008).

  6. Tucker and MacDonald (2004) have also argued that animals do not have moral standing on the traditional view.

  7. E.g. Cohen (2007), Morris (1991), Nussbaum (2006).

  8. It might be objected that Cohen’s view cannot be called contractarian, given the asymmetry (I owe this point to an anonymous Res Publica reviewer). If Anna has moral standing with respect to Ben but Ben does not have moral standing with respect to Anna then they have not entered into a contract. A contract normally requires two parties to have a symmetrical agreement between both parties. However, I do not think this objection is too serious. On Cohen’s account, a contract that results in an individual being accorded moral standing has still been made. It is the contract that is the source of their moral standing, the individual accorded secondary moral standing is accorded it by the contractor as a result of an agreement they have entered into in order to maximise their own self-interest. So, I think that Cohen’s view can still be seen as a broader kind of contractarian view.

  9. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

  10. I owe this point (that the name itself presupposes different levels of standing) to an anonymous Res Publica reviewer. Tucker and MacDonald (2004) make a similar point regarding the terms used.

  11. Those making a contract need not insist others extend direct concern to them (they could confine themselves to indirect consideration). So in this sense the relationship is not necessarily symmetrical. However, rational self-interested individuals are unlikely to forego moral consideration for themselves.

  12. Contractarianism can also yield indirect moral consideration regarding a being. For instance, suppose Ben does not care about Caroline the cat. Caroline was his mother’s pet, but Ben’s mother died. Ben’s mother wanted Caroline to be cared for. Thus, Ben agrees with Anna that she will care for Caroline. However, the agreement is only that Anna feeds Caroline. The agreement is regarding Caroline; Caroline’s moral standing is indirect.

  13. I (2008, 2009, 2011a) discuss this elsewhere.

  14. I would like to thank an anonymous Res Publica reviewer for drawing my attention to this. Cf. Garner (2012b), Kymlicka (1993).

  15. Barry (2000) suggests that different conceptions of the good could be voted on, but, as Garner (2003a) points out, this has to be a last resort for liberals because it undermines moral pluralism.

  16. Carruthers (2011) suggests a contractarian moral account; a virtue ethics type of moral theory could be consistent with a contractarian theory of justice. On this view, what is wrong with torturing a cat is that it displays certain character traits. But this only yields indirect moral standing and so will not suffice here.

  17. Cf. Nussbaum (2004, p. 492).

  18. Some who condemn animal cruelty include: Aquinas (1981), Carruthers (1992), Cohen (1986), Fox (1986), Francis and Norman (1978), Johnson (1991), Kant (1963), Machan (1991), Noddings (1984), Nozick (1974), Rawls (1999), Scruton (2000), Warren (1997).

  19. Huffman (1993) says something similar.

  20. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

  21. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

  22. Becker (2005) says something similar.

  23. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

  24. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1298362.stm and http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,443237,00.html accessed 7 April 2010.

  25. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer.

  26. I discuss the contract as a heuristic device in relation to Rawlsian contractarianism elsewhere (Tanner 2011b).

  27. Similarly, Tucker and MacDonald (2004) regard the fact that secondary moral standing is contingent as ‘troubling’.

  28. It is possible that there may other ways for neo-Hobbesians to interpret the contractarian requirement. But, such an interpretation needs to be provided.

References

  • Abbey, Ruth. 2007. Rawlsian resources for animal ethics. Ethics and the Environment 12: 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aquinas, Thomas. 1981. Summa theologica. Westminster: Christian Classics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barry, Brian. 1989. Theories of justice. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barry, Brian. 1995. Justice as impartiality. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barry, Norman P. 2000. An introduction to modern political theory, 4th ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Lawrence C. 2005. Reciprocity, justice, and disability. Ethics 116: 9–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bellamy, Richard. 1992. Liberalism and modern society: An historical argument. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, Allen. 2009. Moral status and human enhancement. Philosophy & Public Affairs 37: 346–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, Peter. 1992. The animals issue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, Peter. 2011. Against the moral standing of animals. In Practical ethics: questions of life and death, ed. Christopher Morris. Retrieved from http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/The%20Animals%20Issue.pdf.

  • Cavalieri, Paola, and Will Kymlicka. 1996. Expanding the social contract. Etica Animali 8: 5–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coeckelbergh, Mark. 2009. Distributive justice and co-operation in a world of humans and non-humans: A contractarian argument for drawing non-humans into the sphere of justice. Res Publica 15: 67–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, Andrew. 2007. Contractarianism, other-regarding attitudes, and the moral standing of nonhuman animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24: 188–201.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, Andrew. 2009. Contractarianism and interspecies welfare conflicts. Social Philosophy & Policy 26: 227–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, Carl. 1986. The case for the use of animals in biomedical research. The New England Journal of Medicine 315: 865–870.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeGrazia, David. 1996. Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Elliot, Robert. 1984. Rawlsian justice and non-human animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1: 95–106.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Filice, Carlo. 2006. Rawls and non-rational beneficiaries. Between the Species VI. http://cla.calpoly.edu/bts/issue_06/06filice.htm.

  • Fox, Michael A. 1986. The case for animal experimentation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuchs, Alan. 1981. Duties to animals: Rawls’ alleged dilemma. Ethics and Animals 2: 83–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garner, Robert. 2003a. Animals, politics and justice: Rawlsian liberalism and the plight of non-humans. Environmental Politics 12: 3–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garner, Robert. 2003b. Political ideologies and the moral status of animals. Journal of Political Ideologies 8: 233–246.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garner, Robert. 2005. The political theory of animal rights. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garner, Robert. 2006. Animal welfare: A political defense. Journal of Animal Law and Ethics 1: 161–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garner, Robert. 2012a. Rawls, animals and justice: New literature, same responses. Res Publica 18: 159–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garner, Robert. 2012b. Much ado about nothing: Barry, justice and animals. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15: 363–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gauthier, David. 1986. Morals by agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huffman, Tom. 1993. Animals, mental defectives, and the social contract. Between the Species Winter: 20–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, Lawrence. 1991. A morally deep world. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, Immanuel. 1963. Lectures on Ethics (1780-1). Trans. H. Paton. Harper and Row.

  • Kymlicka, Will. 1993. The social contract tradition. In A companion to ethics, ed. Peter Singer, 186–196. Blackwell: Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Machan, Tibor. 1991. Do animals have rights? Public Affairs Quarterly 5: 163–173.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morris, Christopher. 1991. Moral standing and rational-choice contractarianism. In Contractarianism and rational choice, ed. Peter Vallentyne, 76–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Narveson, Jan. 1983. Animal rights revisited. In Ethics and animals, ed. Harlan B. Miller, and William Hatton Williams. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noddings, Nel. 1984. Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, state, and utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, Martha. 2004. Beyond the social contract toward global justice. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 24: 413–507.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plant, Raymond. 1991. Modern political thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice, Revised Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Regan, Tom. 1981. Duties to animals: Rawls’s dilemma. Ethics and Animals 2: 76–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Richards, David. 1971. A theory of reasons for action. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, Mark. 1997. Contractarianism and animal rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14: 235–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, Mark. 2002. Animals like us. London: Verson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, Mark. 2009. Animal rights: Moral theory and practice, 2nd ed. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russow, Lilly-Marlene. 1992. Animals in the original position. Between the Species Fall: 224–233.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandoe, Peter, and Stine B. Christiansen. 2008. Ethics of animal use. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scruton, Roger. 2000. Animal rights and wrongs. London: Demos.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinbock, Bonnie. 2011. Life before birth: The moral and legal status of embryos and foetuses. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, Julia. 2008. Species as a relationship. Acta Analytica 23: 337–347.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, Julia. 2009. The argument from marginal cases and the slippery slope objection. Environmental Values 18: 51–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, Julia. 2011a. The argument from marginal cases: Is species a relevant difference. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11: 225–235.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, Julia. 2011b. Rowlands, Rawlsian justice and animal experimentation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14: 569–587.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tucker, Chris, and MacDonald, Chris. 2004. Beastly contractarianism—A contractarian analysis of the possibility of animal rights. Essays in Philosophy, 5. Retrieved 18 Jan 2011 from http://commons.pacificu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169andcontext=eip.

  • Van De Veer, Donald. 1983. Interspecific justice and animal slaughter. In Ethics and animals, ed. Harlan B. Miller, and William Hatton Williams. Clifton, NJ: Humana Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Warren, Mary. 1997. Moral status: Obligations to persons and other living things. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, Scott. 2001. Carruthers and the argument from marginal cases. Journal of Applied Philosophy 18: 135–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Dr Gerald K. Harrison and anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. http://philpapers.org/autosense.pl?searchStr=Julia%20Tanner

    Julia Tanner

Authors
  1. Julia Tanner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julia Tanner.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tanner, J. Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19, 141–156 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9212-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9212-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation