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Justifying Liberal Neutrality to Liberals

Jonathan Quong: Liberalism Without Perfection. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, 330 pp

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Notes

  1. Consider Rawls’s assertion that ‘if metaphysical presuppositions are involved, perhaps they are so general that they would not distinguish between the metaphysical views—Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist or materialist—with which philosophy has traditionally been concerned. In this case they would not appear to be relevant for the structure and content of a political conception of justice one way or the other’ (Rawls 1996, p. 29, n. 31).

Reference

  • Rawls, John. 1996. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Acknowledgments

Many thanks to the anonymous referee and to Ben Saunders for their useful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland

    Daniel Savery

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  1. Daniel Savery
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Correspondence to Daniel Savery.

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Savery, D. Justifying Liberal Neutrality to Liberals. Res Publica 19, 193–198 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9195-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9195-1

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