Abstract
In this article, I examine A. John Simmons’s philosophical anarchism, and specifically, the problems that result from the combination of its three foundational principles: the strong correlativity of legitimacy rights and political obligations; the strict distinction between justified existence and legitimate authority; and the doctrine of personal consent, more precisely, its supporting assumptions about the natural freedom of individuals and the non-natural states into which individuals are born. As I argue, these assumptions, when combined with the strong correlativity and strict distinction theses, undermine Simmons’s claim, which is central to his philosophical anarchism, that a state may be justified in enforcing the law, even if illegitimate or unjustified in existing.
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Notes
Knowles (2010, Ch. 6) echoes Simmons’s critique, and Horton (2010, Ch. 5) argues that such a priori anarchism makes its case by relying upon questionable assumptions about moral autonomy and the state. For an example of such a priori anarchism, one which Simmons, Knowles, and Horton all criticize, see Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (1970).
Admittedly, this analogy aptly illustrates Simmons’s point. However, the only resemblance the state bears to any sort of business is the voluntary characteristic upon which this analogy hinges, which is itself contentious, making the entire analogy doubly suspect.
As Simmons defines the state of nature as an absence of the political relationship, we can only assume that, in this quote, Simmons has mistakenly identified the state of nature with the absence of the government of the Third Reich.
It might be argued that I have forced this definition upon Simmons, that he (a) specifically differentiates between the state and government and (b) deliberately associates a notion of the state with political society. However, Simmons (a) consistently uses the state and government interchangeably and (b) almost exclusively associates a notion of the state with political society only when discussing Locke’s social contract theory.
Although transactional evaluation should be set aside, Simmons wants to keep this dimension of state evaluation at hand. He insists that, despite all existing states being illegitimate, ‘legitimacy remains an important dimension of institutional evaluation’ (2001, p. 155). However, legitimacy is only relevant regarding the handful of citizens who have consented to be governed by their particular state. If anything, illegitimacy remains an important dimension of institutional evaluation. The difference is important, because a presumption of illegitimacy places the burden of proof on the defender of justified political obligation and prejudices all such defenses from the outset.
As Simmons claims that all existing states are illegitimate, we should assume that he means to say, as he does elsewhere, that such emergencies will throw a corresponding moral weight on the side of justifying conscription.
This distinction between Hobbes’s State of War and Locke’s State of Nature is one to keep in mind. Much of Simmons’s philosophical anarchism, while purportedly based in the latter, only appears plausible when viewed against the former. See footnote 9 below.
One could respond that a state would be justified in existing precisely because its overthrow would cause more significant losses than its continuation. This response, though, is probably too Hobbesean in flavor for Simmons to stomach (see Simmons 2001, p. 125). See also footnote 8 above.
Senor makes a similar point in ‘What If There Are No Political Obligations? A Reply to A. J. Simmons’ (1987, p. 265). In response, Simmons might try to explain these commonsense thoughts by reference to efficacy or expertise (1987, p. 277), by claiming that particular states are more efficient or experienced in taxing and conscripting their own citizens. This rationalization, though, does not explain why a seamless bureaucracy, a maximally efficient and experienced state, would be unjustified in taxing and conscripting citizens from any political society, why the US and the UK governments, if they were such bureaucracies, would be unjustified in taxing and conscripting citizens from the People’s Republic of China. See footnote 6 above.
Horton makes a similar point in ‘In Defence of Associative Political Obligations: Part Two’ (Horton 2007, p. 16).
References
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Prof. John Horton and Prof. Glen Newey, as well as two anonymous referees from Res Publica, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Windeknecht, R.G. Law Without Legitimacy or Justification? The Flawed Foundations of Philosophical Anarchism. Res Publica 18, 173–188 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9175-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9175-x