Abstract
Liberal egalitarianism is commonly criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to status inequalities and the effects of misrecognition. I examine this criticism as it applies to Ronald Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ and argue that, in fact, liberal egalitarians possess the resources to deal effectively with recognition-type issues. More precisely, while conceding that the distributive principles required to realize equality of resources must apply against a particular institutional background, I point out, following Dworkin, that among the principles guiding this background is a ‘principle of independence,’ and that this principle, properly interpreted, requires government to protect people against the disadvantageous effects of wrongful prejudicial discrimination. Moreover, I give an account of wrongful prejudice which is grounded in a particular interpretation of the abstract egalitarian principle Dworkin requires for a government to be legitimate and which goes a long way toward acknowledging status inequalities. Finally, I suggest other resources within the theory for responding to residual problems of recognition not addressed by the principle of independence.
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Notes
My discussion is thus limited to a particular version of recognition theory, albeit an important one. In particular, I ignore the views of theorists such as Taylor (1994) and Honneth (2003), who base claims for recognition in theories about the necessary requirements of undistorted identity formation. This limitation does not reflect any view that these positions are unimportant. Note further that the target of Fraser’s critique, as well as the other theorists mentioned above, is much broader than just equality of resources. Note finally that Fraser is primarily concerned with integrating the recognition and redistributive dimensions of justice, and that my focus on her views on recognition exclusively, therefore, merely presents a partial picture of her views.
The precise status of the hypothetical insurance scheme within equality of resources is contested (cf. Dworkin 2002; Williams 2004). Is it a second-best solution to the existence of envy, which can only hope to mitigate and not fully neutralize resource inequalities so that we would still have some cause for regret after the insurance scheme is realized? Or should it be seen as the best solution to differences in circumstances so that the implementation of hypothetical insurance would be a full realization of the demands of equality of resources? Dworkin has apparently come to see the insurance device in the latter manner (Dworkin 2002, p. 121). He now thinks that equality of resources should be seen as demanding equality ex ante, i.e. before risks have materialized, rather than ex post. Equality of resources ex ante would be satisfied if people had had opportunity to insure against various risks on equal terms, even though some people will end up less wealthy or successful after risks have eventuated, since they would not have bought full coverage ex ante. The insurance scheme will only be seen as a second-best solution if equality of resources really required equality ex post. For arguments motivating Dworkin’s view and further discussion, see Williams (2004).
Here I have interpreted the example as involving racist beliefs, but the taxi driver could also in fact be exercising (non-racist) statistical discrimination out of concern for his own safety instead. In that case, his conduct will be objectionable on different grounds as discussed immediately below.
The comparison with equality of (opportunity for) welfare, however, might prompt the reader to ask whether this egalitarian theory, e.g. as defended by Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989), in fact represents a more attractive answer to the problem of recognition. I will respond with two points: first, it is by no means clear that equality of welfare would always be more sensitive to the plight of individuals subject to misrecognition or social oppression. One reason why is the existence of adaptive preferences: An individual subject to misrecognition might adapt her preferences to her perceived opportunities, so that her preference satisfaction is actually higher than her oppressor’s. Of course, the welfarist might respond to this by requiring particular circumstances for preference formation, so the existence of adaptive preferences is not decisive against welfarism. However, this shows that equality of welfare per se is not better suited to handle misrecognition. Second, one might object to equating the predicaments of people subject to misrecognition to those of people having expensive tastes on the grounds that this seems insulting to the former. At any rate, I believe that equality of (opportunity for) welfare should be rejected for the reasons given by Dworkin (2000, pp. 11–64) and Clayton (2000, pp. 75–81).
As I have interpreted PI, it only targets wrongful prejudicial discrimination that is disadvantageous to the victim. One might object to this, however, on the following grounds. Suppose that an applicant is denied a job on grounds of race which he would not have been offered by a non-racist panel because he is unqualified for it. It seems that the applicant does not suffer a disadvantage on the view of PI that I have adopted, because the contemptuous treatment of the panel does not result in him being worse off than he would be in the absence of their contempt. But he seems clearly to be treated wrongfully in the panel's deliberations regarding his application.
In response, the account developed here does acknowledge that the panel’s action is wrongful discrimination since it is based on unwarranted prejudice and violates the principle of intrinsic value. A resource egalitarian can hold this view while they say that the PI only targets disadvantageous wrongful discrimination. Furthermore, if we attend to other aspects of equality of resources pertaining to political equality and Dworkin’s remarks about partnership democracy that I have ignored in this paper, there might be other objections to prejudicial deliberation and non-efficacious discrimination than those stemming from PI. I owe this suggestion and the example to an anonymous reviewer.
I owe this example to an anonymous reviewer.
Accordingly some instances of so-called indirect discrimination are not wrongful, disadvantageous discrimination from a resource egalitarian perspective. Indirect discrimination occurs when a rule applies equally to everyone, but in a way in which particular types of persons are unable or less able to comply with the rule, and the rule is not reasonably justified. There are two possibilities. Either the rule that apparently applies equally to all is adopted in order to disadvantage a particular group, or in some other way relies on prejudiced beliefs. In that case, it is clearly within the scope of PI. The rule might simply have a disparate impact on different people, though, without being caused by prejudice. In that case, the rule is compatible with PI, and it would thus not be considered wrongful, disadvantageous discrimination by equality of resources. For a similar judgment, see Barry (2001, p. 34).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the participants at the conference Whose Opportunities? A Critique of Equality, Lisbon, October 29-31 2009 as well as Morten Brænder, Simon Laumann Jørgensen, Per Mouritsen, Orsolya Reich, and especially Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Søren Midtgaard, and Andrew Williams for their helpful suggestions and generous comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, I would also like to thank the reviewers of this journal for their constructive criticisms.
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Hansen, R.S. Equality of Resources and the Problem of Recognition. Res Publica 17, 157–174 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9146-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9146-2