Abstract
We argue there is a deep conflict in Paul Moser’s work on divine hiddenness (DH). Moser’s treatment of DH adopts a thesis we call SEEK: DH often results from failing to seek God on His terms. One way in which people err, according to Moser, is by trusting arguments of traditional natural theology to lead to filial knowledge of God. We argue that Moser’s SEEK thesis commits him to the counterfactual ACCESS: had the atheist sought after God in harmony with how God reveals himself, she would have had access to filial knowledge of God. By failing to incorporate arguments or propositional evidence for God’s existence, Moser’s account leaves the doubting seeker without any evidential reason to think that either SEEK or ACCESS is true. Without this rational motivation in place, the doubting seeker is unlikely to seek after God in the way ACCESS describes. We argue that natural theology provides an evidential epistemic aid to motivate persons to seek God the way ACCESS describes. Thus, Moser is mistaken. Such arguments can be evidentially helpful in coming to know God. In conclusion, we explain how our reply naturally fits how we form and maintain trusting interpersonal relationships with others.
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Notes
See van Inwagen (2002, pp. 29–30) for more on these two distinctions. We go into more detail on the latter distinction in “Rejecting natural theology leaves ACCESS rationally unmotivated for some” section, where we offer our principal objection to Moser’s view.
Notice that SEEK does not exclude the reality that divine hiddenness can at times be caused by God who waits to reveal himself at a later time for morally sufficient reasons.
His most thorough treatment to date is Moser (2008).
For a response to Moser, see Woldeyohannes (2013).
It should be noted that filial knowledge is distinct from propositional knowledge and is best understood as a type of knowledge by acquaintance. See Rickabaugh (2013).
Moser has acknowledged that such arguments can provide psychological or aesthetic value to their user, but he denies that they have any epistemic value. See, Moser (2010, pp. 159–160).
Here we have in mind a famous remark by Russell. When asked by Leo Rosten, what Russell would say if after he died he met God, Russell said he would say to God, “Sir, why did you not give me better evidence?” (Rosten 1974, p. 26).
There is a hidden premise between (3) and (4). “If x can serve as an epistemic aid for the person who sincerely seeks to know God, then it is not the case that x is useless (distracting, damaging) to the person who sincerely seeks to know God.” This seems to be uncontroversial, and so we leave it hidden for purposes of readability.
Here we have in mind common commitments such as naturalism, the presumption of atheism, and the notion that talk of God is meaningless or any other commitment that would preclude one from earnestly seeking God. We understand these are not commitments all atheists share.
Moser has acknowledged that such arguments can provide psychological or aesthetic value to their user, but he denies that they have any epistemic value. See, Moser (2010, pp. 159–160). Discussion of the success of individual theistic arguments is not needed here. Rather, this paper’s focus is on the value of theistic arguments generally. In short, this paper addresses the value of arguments of natural theology; it is not a project to evaluate soundness of a particular argument of natural theology, and whether a particular argument is sound. That is another project.
It is likely that Moser would respond by arguing that the God of natural theology is not the God of the Bible, hence the God of natural theology fails to ground our trust. However, for our argument to run through it simply needs to be the case that traditional natural theology would epistemically help one in finding and ultimately trusting in the God of the Bible. We are not claiming that the arguments of natural theology alone can produce trust in the God of the Bible.
To be clear, we hold a very high view of religious experience and knowing God in relationship. One of us has defended a type of interpersonal knowledge of God similar to Moser’s filial knowledge of God. See, Rickabaugh (2013).
Concerns over the soundness of specific theistic arguments have a place, but not here. We mean only to build the case for natural theology arguments in general.
Of course Moser would not grant this, as he is critical of the argument from natural theology. In his view arguments of natural theology do not even confirm theistic belief even for believers, especially belief in the God of the Bible. However, the success of natural theology arguments is a topic for another paper.
Notice that such cases do not rule out those in which one enters into a relationship without prior propositional knowledge based on third-person arguments, such as normal encounters not initiated on persuasive testimony—e.g., a mixer, an office party, meeting new neighbors, and so on.
Scriptures often speaks of the divine and human relationship in Father and child terms. For instance, Jesus refers to God as Father over 165 times in the Gospels (e.g., John 4:34), and the Pauline letters describe God as Father over 40 times, including the report that the Spirit of God is crying out in human hearts “Abba, Father” (e.g., Gal 4:6; cf. Rom 8:16). Similarly, Scripture talks in terms of a bride and bridegroom relationship (e.g., Rev. 19:7, 212).
New Testament scholar, Ben Witherington, states, “From a rhetorical point of view the function of the…quotations here is to cite an authority recognized by one’s audience to support one’s point” (1998, p. 530).
We have in mind here, as in footnote 20, the distinction between an epistemic reason and a psychological or aesthetic reason.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Tedla Woldeyohannes, Trent Dougherty, and Trenton Merricks for providing helpful feedback on the first draft of this paper. We would also like to thank those who attended our presentation of this paper at the 2015 British Society for the Philosophy of Religion Conference on Divine Hiddenness, at Oxford University.
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Rickabaugh, B.L., McAllister, D.L. Who you could have known: divine hiddenness, epistemic counterfactuals, and the recalcitrant nature of natural theology. Int J Philos Relig 82, 337–348 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9580-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9580-3