Abstract
In this article I shall analyse and evaluate analytic theists’ views of what it takes to be a person of faith. I suggest that the subject can be approached by posing requirements a person must allegedly fulfil in order to count as a person of faith. These requirements can be referred to as aspects of faith. According to my analysis, four different aspects of faith can be distinguished: the cognitive, the evaluative-affective, the practical, and the interpersonal. There have been divergent assessments about which aspects are indispensable for faith and how they should be understood.
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Notes
As far as I know, the only even slightly similar treatment to the one at hand is Bishop (2010). However, the scope of Bishop’s description is broader than mine and my analysis diverges from that of Bishop, as I shall point out in the last section of this paper. For different analytically oriented approaches to the nature of faith see e.g. Audi (2011), Lad Sessions (1994) and Yandell (1990).
Audi (2011, pp. 53–54) has distinguished seven different concepts of faith which he thinks the discourse of everyday life contains: “(1) propositional faith, indicated where someone is said to have faith that something is so, (2) attitudinal faith, designated where a person is said to have faith in some being (or other entity, such as an institution), (3) creedal faith, that is, a set of tenets designated by ‘a religious faith’, the kind of faith one belongs to by virtue of commitment to at least its central tenets, (4) global faith, the kind whose possession makes one a person of faith and can qualify one as religious provided that the content of the faith is appropriate, (5) doxastic faith, illustrated by believing something ‘on faith’ (or, perhaps not quite equivalently, ‘in faith’), so we may conceive doxastic faith as one kind of propositional faith, (6) acceptant faith, referred to when someone is said to accept another person, or claimed proposition or proposed action, ‘in good faith’ or, sometimes, ‘on faith’, and (7) what we might call allegiant faith (or loyalty faith), which is roughly fidelity, as exemplified by keeping faith with someone.” For further discussion on these locutions see Audi (2011, pp. 54–62). The notion of faith we are interested in is roughly equivalent to Audi’s global faith. One might note that this concept is close to fides qua creditur, which is contrasted with fides quae creditur. The latter approximates to Audi’s creedal faith.
According to the Thomist tradition, the proposition that there is a God is not, strictly speaking, part of the propositional content of faith but a preamble of it. For it was argued that God’s existence can be known by rational enquiry without special revelation, but the proper content of faith is not knowable in such a way. Instead, the content is specially revealed by God through different mediums (say, Christ, the Bible, or the Church) and concerns God’s nature and the acts he has done. See e.g. Kenny (1983, pp. 69–70, 74–75), Swinburne (2005, p. 138).
Swinburne (2005, p. 228) puts this point as follows: “If you insist that, to be a Christian, someone must believe that the creed as a whole is more probable than its negation, it is as though you are telling someone who needs a fortune, and wishes to buy a lottery ticket in the hope of getting it, that he is only allowed to buy the ticket if he believes that the odds are in favour of the ticket winning. That seems unreasonable”.
For example, suppose S estimates that P(p) = 0.4, P(q) = 0.3, and P(r) = 0.3. Here S weakly believes that p against q and r, since P(p) > P(q) and P(p) > P(r), but S does not strongly believe that p, since P(p) < P(not-p).
I leave it open whether a person who is agnostic about the possibility of God’s existence could have faith of a realist kind. One might note that the question of the possibility of God’s existence pertains to the epistemology of modality and is by no means a trivial issue. On modal epistemology see e.g. Vaidya (2015).
Plantinga (2000, p. 291) offers an interesting suggestion according to which the demons might not after all have the relevant beliefs: “The content of faith is plausibly indexical: a person x has faith if x believes or knows that God is benevolent toward x herself. But perhaps the devils do not believe that God is benevolent toward them. They know that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good, and that he has arranged a way of salvation for human beings; but perhaps they reject the belief that God is benevolent toward them”.
Here is what Plantinga says in one connection: “Chief among these right affections is love of God—desire for God, desire to know him, to have a personal relationship with him, desire to achieve a certain kind of unity with him, as well as delight in him, relishing his beauty, greatness, holiness, and the like. There is also trust, approval, gratitude, intending to please, expecting good things, and much more” (Plantinga 2000, p. 292).
According to J. P. Day, Kant emphasized hoping: the postulates of practical are something one hopes for. See Day (1991, pp. 39–42).
One remark relating to the issue at hand may be worth of notice: on the face of it, it is tempting to ask whether “belief in x” and similar expressions “trust in x” and “faith in x” require “belief that x exists”—or, for that matter, “faith that x exists” or “trust that x exists”. I do not wish to settle this issue here. My concern is just to point out that unless one clearly explicates what one means by “belief/faith/trust in”, it is pointless to consider whether they call for “belief/faith/trust that”. For example, while it is prima facie queer to claim “I trust in God but I do not believe that God exists” (cf. Helm 2000, p. 149), according to Swinburne’s analysis of trust there is nothing absurd in this claim. In Swinburne’s view to trust God is, roughly, to act on the assumption that God will do for you what you want or need, and he rightly maintains that such conduct is feasible with mere assumption that there is a God. So, in Swinburne’s view one need not (strongly) believe that God exists in order to trust God (Swinburne 2005, p. 144, 147).
Helm’s distinction between having thin and thick beliefs about God is rather extensive. For further elucidation see Helm (2000, pp. 103–111).
I am inclined to think that one should not build too much into this “feeling” belief allegedly involves, though some seem to do that and though the term appears to be a typical choice of words to describe the phenomenology of belief. Instead of feeling I could equally speak of (involuntarily) seeing or perceiving, for example. For some further discussion see e.g. Eklund (2014, p. 310).
In Bishop’s words, “a theist’s practical commitment involves […] taking it to be true (with full weight) that God exists in his or her practical reasoning; and doing so while holding that God exists (i.e. while having the belief that God exists)” (Bishop 2007, pp. 106–107). Bishop’s “take to be true” and “hold true” correspond to Cohen’s “acceptance” and “belief” respectively. See Bishop (2007, pp. 29–30, 33–41).
As one can see, Kinghorn holds that a personal relationship with God is an authority relation. Moser appears to have a similar conception. See e.g. Moser (2008, pp. 61, 66). Such a link between personal relationship and authority does not hold of necessity in human–human relationships (think about friendships, for example), but it seems to go for divine-human relationships, as God is typically conceived as the ultimate authority. In this connection it may be interesting to note that Kinghorn’s account resembles Bochenski’s analysis of authority. According to Bochenski, authority is a triadic relation A(x, y, g), where x is the authority, y is the subject of authority, and g is the subject matter in which x has authority over y. In Bochenski’s view, y generally accepts g because it is communicated by x. See Bochenski (1974). The similarity of Bochenski’s view to that of Kinghorn is evident: not much would alter in Kinghorn’s view, were he to say that personal relationship with God is a Bochenskian triadic relation A(G, S, invitational statements). For discussion on Bochenski’s view and divine authority, in general, see Knuuttila (2004).
James Beilby has criticized Plantinga’s A/C model of faith on similar grounds. See Beilby (2007, pp. 140–141).
While not taking a stand on such theological questions as whether Christian faith requires membership in the church through baptism, Audi notes that one might think that Christian commitment entirely apart from the church is not full-blooded. But even here Audi seems to hesitate, while at the same time he grants that religious commitment of communal sort may be richer and more supportive than religious commitment which lacks such dimension. See Audi (2011, pp. 96–99).
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Eklund, DJ. The nature of faith in analytic theistic philosophy of religion. Int J Philos Relig 80, 85–99 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9545-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9545-y