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Faith, reason, and charity in Thomas Aquinas’s thought

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Abstract

Aquinas’s thought is often considered an exemplary balance between Christian faith and natural reason. However, it is not always sufficiently clear what such balance consists of. With respect to the relation between philosophical topics and the Christian faith, various scholars have advanced perspectives that, although supported by Aquinas’s texts, contrast one another. Some maintain that Aquinas elaborated his philosophical view without being under the influence of faith. Others believe that the Christian faith constitutes an indispensable component of Aquinas’s view; at least when Aquinas focused on those statements that, though maintainable by mere reason, belong to the Christian revelation. In this essay I intend to show that the aforementioned perspectives can be reconciled on the basis of Aquinas’s concept of faith. If we do not limit ourselves to considering faith as the assent to the revealed truth, but also look at what leads the believer to assent—i.e., charity that unites the believer with God and is gratuitously conceded by God himself—then the relation between faith and reason appears to be twofold. On the one hand, the truths of faith cannot participate in the rational inquiry, because according to Aquinas faith lacks the evidence searched for by natural reason. On the other hand, since Aquinas holds that faith is the assent to the revelation due to the love for God that is granted by God himself, the believer will take faith as more certain than intellect and science, and the truths of faith will constitute the orientation and criterion of her/his rational investigation. The truths shall constitute orientation because the believer aims to confirm by reason what she/he already believes. They will also be criterion, because in case of a contradiction between rational arguments and revealed truths, reason must be considered mistaken and the rational investigation must start anew from the beginning.

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Notes

  1. “Quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut perfectio perfectibile” (Aquinas 1920, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1, quoted in McInerny 2006, p. 29).

  2. “De eodem secundum idem non potest esse simul in uno homine scientia nec cum opinione nec cum fide, alia tamen et alia ratione. \({\ldots }\) non potest simul idem et secundum idem esse scitum et creditum, quia scitum est visum et creditum est non visum, ut dictum est” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4).

  3. \({\ldots }\) per seipsa movent intellectum nostrum vel sensum ad sui cognitionem” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 1, a. 4).

  4. \({\ldots }\) ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 2, a. 9).

  5. “Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui demonstrationem non capit” (Aquinas 1920, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1).

  6. \({\ldots }\) saltem per fidem praesupponi ab his qui horum demonstrationem non habent” (Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II–II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3, my translation).

  7. Aquinas’s statement resembles the definition “what in principle everybody knows,” which has been used precisely by McInerny to stress the autonomy of philosophical reflection from the influence of faith. To put it in McInerny’s own words, “philosophy is a discourse that pins itself to truths that are in the public domain, so that an argument must always be hooked up to the things that in principle everybody knows.” (1998, pp. 145–146). Let me add that perhaps Alvin Plantinga’s words make the meaning of “what in principle everybody knows” clearer: “What we all or nearly all know or take for granted or firmly believe, or what at any rate those conducting the inquiry know or take for granted or believe” (2000, p. 272).

  8. \({\ldots }\) sicut patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat” (Aquinas 1920, I, q. 2, a. 1).

  9. “Falsa \({\ldots }\) opinio infirmitas quaedam intellectus est. ... Defectus autem per accidens sunt: quia praeter naturae intentionem. Quod autem est per accidens, non potest esse semper et in omnibus. \({\ldots }\) Ita iudicium quod ab omnibus de veritate datur, non potest esse erroneum” (Aquinas 1955–1957, II, 34).

  10. A similar perspective has been advanced by Arvin Vos who attentively compared Aquinas’ and Protestant’s positions on the relation between faith and reason. According to him, it is in the modern age that preambles of faith have been seen as a rational way to justify the Christian belief, while this was not of interest to Aquinas (see Vos 1985, p. 89).

  11. Gilson (1957, p. 184). Also, Guy de Broglie stated that this idea should not be attributed to Aquinas’s reflection, but was rather elaborated by those Cartesian thinkers who used to demonstrate God’s existence and soul’s immortality in order to show the rationality of the act of faith. See de Broglie (1953).

  12. In my opinion Eleonore Stump has also interpreted Aquinas’s epistemology in this sense. On the basis of her view of Thomistic doctrine of knowledge, if our cognitive faculties have been given to us by God in order to let us achieve the truth, then “when we use sense and intellect as God designed them to be used in the environment suited to them,” our cognitive capacities will turn out to be reliable (see Stump 1992, p. 147). For more on this, see Di Ceglie (2014).

  13. “Si quid ... in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophia, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis. Et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophiae huiusmodi errorem refellere vel ostendendo omnino esse impossibile vel ostendendo non esse necessarium” (Aquinas 1946, q. 2, a. 3).

  14. “Quod non accidat in demonstratione peccatum, oportet non latere quod multoties videtur demonstrari universale, non autem demonstratur” (Aquinas 1970, I, lectio 12).

  15. My hypothesis appears to be supported by the following passage: “A man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 4 a. 8 ad 2).

  16. “Actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motae per gratiam” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 2, a. 9).

  17. “Obiectum autem fidei potest tripliciter considerari. Cum enim credere ad intellectum pertineat prout est a voluntate motus ad assentiendum, ut dictum est, potest obiectum fidei accipi vel ex parte ipsius intellectus, vel ex parte voluntatis intellectum moventis. Si quidem ex parte intellectus, sic in obiecto fidei duo possunt considerari. ... Quorum unum est materiale obiectum fidei. Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deum, quia, sicut supra dictum est, nihil proponitur nobis ad credendum nisi secundum quod ad Deum pertinet. Aliud autem est formalis ratio obiecti, quod est sicut medium propter quod tali credibili assentitur. Et sic ponitur actus fidei credere Deo, quia, sicut supra dictum est, formale obiectum fidei est veritas prima, cui inhaeret homo ut propter eam creditis assentiat. Si vero consideretur tertio modo obiectum fidei, secundum quod intellectus est motus a voluntate, sic ponitur actus fidei credere in Deum, veritas enim prima ad voluntatem refertur secundum quod habet rationem finis” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 2, a. 2).

  18. Henry Price, in an essay which does not present any reference to Aquinas, states something similar: “There are two senses of ‘believe in’. First there is a factual sense. Here belief-in is clearly reducible to belief-that\({\ldots }\). Secondly, there is also the “evaluative sense of ’believe in’. Here believing-in amounts to something like esteeming or trusting; and in this second sense, believing-in seems to be quite a different attitude from believing-that” (Price 1965, p. 17).

  19. “Ea enim quae sunt fidei excedunt rationem humanam: unde non cadunt in contemplatione hominis nisi Deo revelante. \({\ldots }\) Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 6, a. 1).

  20. According to Aquinas the believer is moved to believe for many reasons such as miracles and, what is more (quod plus est), “by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation (interiori instinctu Dei invitantis)” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 2, a. 9, ad 3).

  21. Aquinas states that “science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith (principalis et propria causa fidei) is that which moves man inwardly to assent” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1).

  22. This perspective has been summarized by P. J. Riga in the passage I have already partially quoted above: “For St. Thomas faith is the assent to the true on the authority of the one who reveals this truth, and thus faith is formally an act of the intelligence. Yet, Thomas does recognize the large part which the will plays in the act of faith. Love renders the act of faith meritorious and, as it were, informs and gives life to faith and the adherence itself is a work of love so that the act of faith is an act intrinsically determined by affective elements” (Riga 1971, p. 168).

  23. “Caritas dicitur forma fidei, inquantum per caritatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 4, a. 3).

  24. “Sed horum quae Deus facit vel facere potest, tanto aliquis intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum videt” (Aquinas 1920, I, q. 12, a. 8).

  25. “Intellectus plus participans de lumine gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de lumine gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate, quia ubi est maior caritas, ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit” (Aquinas 1920, I, q. 12, a. 6).

  26. “Alia circa creaturas et Philosophus et Fidelis considerat. Philosophus namque considerat illa quae eis secundum naturam propriam conveniunt: sicut igni ferri sursum. Fidelis autem ea solum considerat circa creaturas quae eis conveniunt secundum quod sunt ad Deum relata: utpote, quod sunt a Deo creata, quod sunt Deo subiecta, et huiusmodi” (Aquinas 1955–1957, II, 4).

  27. “And so, following this order, after what has been said in Book I about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which derive from Him” (Aquinas 1955–1957, II, 4).

  28. Perhaps this is why an interpreter of the Angelic Doctor has affirmed that “Aquinas has a great confidence in the rectitude of nature as it came out of the hands of the Creator” (Elders 2008, p. 249).

  29. “Ego hoc vel praecipuum vitae meae officium debere me Deo conscius sum, ut eum omnis sermo meus et sensus loquatur” (Aquinas 1955–1957, I, 2).

  30. “Ratio ... humana inducta ad ea quae sunt fidei dupliciter potest se habere ad voluntatem credentis. Uno quidem modo, sicut praecedens, puta cum quis aut non haberet voluntatem, aut non haberet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, nisi ratio humana induceretur. Et sic ratio humana inducta diminuit meritum fidei ... Alio modo ratio humana potest se habere ad voluntatem credentis consequenter. Cum enim homo habet promptam voluntatem ad credendum, diligit veritatem creditam, et super ea excogitat et amplectitur si quas rationes ad hoc invenire potest. Et quantum ad hoc ratio humana non excludit meritum fidei, sed est signum maioris meriti” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 2, a. 10, emphasis added).

  31. Aquinas uses arguments once he is sure that God exists. According to Brian Leftow, Aquinas “does not raise it [the existence of God] as a matter he seeks to settle by argument. He takes it for granted that God exists” (2006, p. ix, my emphasis). Another scholar of Aquinas, Brian Davies, says that Summa Theologiae “contains a lot of sustained philosophical arguments even while presupposing the truth of certain religious beliefs” (2006, p. ix).

  32. “Rationes demonstrativae inductae ad ea quae sunt fidei, praeambula tamen ad articulos, etsi diminuant rationem fidei, quia faciunt esse apparens id quod proponitur; non tamen diminuunt rationem caritatis, per quam voluntas est prompta ad ea credendum etiam si non apparerent” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2, my emphasis).

  33. See footnote 2.

  34. “Gratia est perfectior quam natura: unde non deficit in his in quibus homo per naturam perfici potest” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 9, a. 1).

  35. A conviction that is widespread among Christians, as rightly pointed out by Terence Penelhum, can therefore be rejected: “It is common for Protestant, as well Catholic, thinkers to say that there cannot be conclusive reasons for the commitment that faith involves, since if there were such reasons, there would be no freedom in the commitment and hence no merit in making it” (1977, p. 140). On the contrary, “perhaps what makes faith voluntary is not that its grounds are inconclusive, but that even if they are conclusive, men are free to deceive themselves and refuse to admit that they are” (p. 153).

  36. “Dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 4, a. 8).

  37. \({\ldots }\) ex hac parte fides est minus certa” (ibid.).

  38. “Certainty can mean two things. The first is firmness of adherence, and with reference to this, faith is more certain than any understanding [of principles] and scientific knowledge. For the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or scientific knowledge. The second is the evidence of that to which assent is given. Here, faith does not have certainty, but scientific knowledge and understanding do” (Aquinas 1953, q. 14, a. 1, ad 7).

  39. “Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quae contra fidem inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta” (Aquinas 1920, I, q. 1, a. 8).

  40. Notice that the trust in question is not strictly due to reason. As I have just shown, it is based on two principles. The former (faith is based on the infallible truth) is clearly due to faith, the latter (it is impossible to demonstrate what negates the truth) seems to be proposed by Aquinas neither as a demonstration nor as an intuition.

  41. “In so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God’s word, on which faith is founded” (Aquinas 1920, II–II, q. 4, a. 8, ad 3, my emphasis).

  42. My position appears quite distant from another proposal advanced by John Wippel that intends to conciliate the influence of the Christian faith on reason and the autonomy of reason from faith. Wippel believes that some philosophical hypotheses can be drawn from the Christian faith: “for the Christian it may be that in certain instances some revealed datum serves as a leading question or working hypothesis for his philosophical inquiry.” At the same time he thinks that it is necessary to keep such truths out of philosophical reflection. Wippel suggests distinguishing “between the order or moment of discovery, on the one hand, and the order or moment of proof, on the other.” For him, “in the moment of proof his [the Christian’s] procedure cannot be described as Christian philosophy. But since in the moment of discovery it was his religious belief that first suggested this particular issue to him as a possible subject for philosophical investigation, one might refer to such a procedure as Christian philosophy in the order of discovery” (1984, p. 280). In short, philosophy is the “moment of proof” in which one demonstrates the rational validity of the hypothesis. Truths of various origin can contribute to philosophical discourse only as suggestions and possible answers that must be verified by the philosophical process. This process remains “philosophical” only if strictly argumentative, while “Christian” is what Wippel names the “moment of discovery”; that is, a pre-philosophical context from which suggestions and possible answers are drawn. Philosophy is then “pure philosophy” when it coincides with the “moment of proof”: it is a process of demonstration. In conclusion, though Wippel’s proposal constitutes an insightful attempt to conciliate faith and reason, he considers such relation only from the point of view of the intellectual character of faith—that is, faith seen as a complex of truths to believe. In this way he ends up dividing two stages too rigidly, and saying that “Christian philosophy” is not “pure philosophy.”

  43. “Deus est quidem quo omnia cognoscuntur, non ita quod alia non cognoscantur nisi eo cognito, sicut in principiis per se notis accidit: sed quia per eius influentiam omnis causatur in nobis cognitio” (Aquinas 1955–1957, I, 11, my emphasis).

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Di Ceglie, R. Faith, reason, and charity in Thomas Aquinas’s thought. Int J Philos Relig 79, 133–146 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9513-6

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