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Rationalist atheology

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Abstract

Atheology, accurately defined by Alvin Plantinga, offers reasons why god’s existence is implausible. Skeptically reasoning that theological arguments for god fail to make their case is one way of leaving supernaturalism in an implausible condition. This ‘rationalist’ atheology appeals to logical standards to point out fallacies and other sorts of inferential gaps. Beyond that methodological marker, few shared tactics characterize atheists and agnostics stalking theological targets. If unbelief be grounded on reason, let atheology start from a theological stronghold: the principle of sufficient reason, a cornerstone of rationality. Seven rules, corollaries to that principle, are enough to show how theological arguments for god repeatedly contravene rationality by perpetuating mysteries, contradictions, begging of questions, pseudo-explanations, and the like. None of these complaints are new, nor has theology been unaware of them. Disorganized atheology has, so far, allowed theology to appear to answer them. Five major arguments for god are systematically analyzed and refuted using these seven rules of rationality, as a preliminary exercise illustrating this re-organized and re-focused rationalist atheology.

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Notes

  1. The term ‘atheology’ goes back to philosopher Ralph Cudworth, the seventeenth century Cambridge Platonist. He applied that label to the godless Greek philosophies, such as atomism and Epicureanism, which he was attempting to refute in the course of expounding a systematic theology (Cudworth 1678, p. 61).

  2. Exemplary volumes offering a great deal of rationalist atheology include Nielsen (1985), Martin (1990), Le Poidevin (1996), Martin and Monnier (2003), Sobel (2003), Everett (2004), Kenny (2004), Oppy (2006), and Shook (2010).

  3. Agnostic philosopher Schellenberg (2009) infers that just an aspirational faith in the ultimate remains reasonable for any religious person. Lacking any concrete conception of this ideally ultimate reality, he offers an utter mystery as an explanatory ideal, allowing people to faithfully imagine whatever meaningfully elevates their lives. But people will fancy and adore what they will, and no agnostic could judge their convictions. Where every attractive religious idea is ‘reasonable’, nothing about god could be.

  4. For an atheological survey of ontological arguments, including modal logic arguments, see Oppy (1995) and Rundle (2004).

  5. For an introduction to theism and perfections of god, see Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2002). Individual philosophers and critical examinations of their ontological arguments can’t be listed here, yet Descartes can’t be avoided; one may begin by consulting Marion (1986). Atheological arguments exposing paradoxes of divine perfection are collected in Martin and Monnier (2003). Any large treatise on Christian theology can explain typical responses to these venerable arguments.

  6. William Lane Craig runs afoul of this difficulty in his modern version of this Kalām argument (1979). His later versions don’t fare any better; see e.g. Craig and Sinclair (2009). Graham Oppy (2006, pp. 137–154) details rationalist atheology criticisms, expanding objections over infinity along with additional problems.

  7. Theological discussions of divine creation are discussed in such works as May (1994), Copan and Craig (2004), and Burrell (2010).

  8. On intelligent design, consult Behe (2007), Dembski and McDowell (2008), and Monton (2009). Atheological rejections of intelligent design are included in Pennock (2001) and Edis and Young (2006).

  9. Many aspects to the design and fine-tuning arguments are discussed in Manson (2003). Recently formulated versions of this fine tuning argument, cognizant of scientific research, are presented by McGrath (2009) and Barrow et al. (2012). Several of the skeptical criticisms presented in this section are indebted to Stenger (2011).

  10. The universe’s harmful indifference initiates the “problem of evil” argument against a personal caring god who intended to create us. Theodicies try to reconcile a preconceived notion of god with the observed world, claiming that their god would design this world no matter what. Theodicies lack clear and comprehensive explanations why observed evils are actually good, leaving matters in mystery (violating Rule 1), requiring the same thing to be both evil and good (violating Rule 2), treating something as supremely good without proving a divine existence first (violating Rule 3), regarding evil as the responsibility of a perfectly good god (violating Rule 4), implying divine involvement without actually explaining it (violating Rule 5), blaming evil on a bad deity but leaving no reason for a good deity (violating Rule 6), or claiming that evil is necessarily from god but god is the singular being able to let evil happen without losing perfect goodness—unlike humanity (violating Rule 7). See recent surveys by Drees (2003) and O’Connor (2009).

  11. Scholars of religion no longer blithely assume that all religious experiences are homogenously alike, or have similar orientations to the same trans-experiential reality. Ineffability is just too convenient, and too tempting. Religions dictate appropriate language and understandings for unusual mental episodes, which then turn out to support just their creeds. Psychologists can apply a crafted set of criteria they define as a ‘mystical’ core and promptly find plenty of phenomena satisfying that set (Hood 2001; Paloutzian and Park 2005). Neither religions nor mystics are wrong about finding just what they seek. The actual diversity to spectrums of atypical states of awareness is undiminished all the same, while the import of such experiences remains radically underdetermined. Respect for pluralism has accordingly revived (Proudfoot 1985; Harmless 2007).

  12. It’s a rare book which systematically commits every one of these violations; coming close is Hick (2007). Hick had many predecessors seeking that elusive revelatory core to all religions; see for example Ward (1994).

  13. Sophisticated versions of these points against hearsay about revelations and miracles are discussed in Fogelin (2003).

  14. Compendiums of arguments from collective and individual revelations, committing about every one of the violations recounted here, are in Alston (1991), Yandell (1994), and Swinburne (2004, chap. 6). Wider perspectives on the diverse roles for religious experience within religion are offered by Bagger (1999) and Taves (2009).

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  1. Philosophy Department, University at Buffalo, 135 Park Hall, Buffalo, NY, 14260, USA

    John R. Shook

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Shook, J.R. Rationalist atheology. Int J Philos Relig 78, 329–348 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9498-6

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