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Faith and Trust

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Abstract

This paper begins with the oft-repeated claim that having (religious) faith involves trust in God. Taking this platitude seriously requires at least two philosophical tasks. First, one must address the relevant notion of “trust” guiding the platitude. I offer a sketch of epistemic trust: arguing that epistemic trust involves several components: acceptance, communication, dependence, and confidence. The first duo concerns the epistemic element of epistemic trust and the second part delimit the fiducial aspect to epistemic trust. Second, one must also examine what differentiates faith qua trust. I argue that we should not distinguish faith from trust merely by believing religious propositions but by the attitudes they express. In particular, the attitude of faith is more deeply entrenched and central to one’s noetic structure than trust simpliciter. The paper ends by arguing that the account proposed insofar as it accommodates and explains certain “faith desiderata”. We can thus give content to the “faith is a kind of trust” platitude with a model of trust on hand while showing how that model confirms and explains important features of faith.

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Notes

  1. See, e.g., Tennant (1989), Pojman (1986), Muyskens (1979), Sessions’ (1994) “hope model” of faith, and Hick (1989).

  2. For an introduction into just how ambiguous, see Sessions’ (1994, pp. 7–10) catalogue.

  3. See Audi (2008, pp. 92–93).

  4. See Audi (1993, pp. 75–76).

  5. A short but important list of philosophers linking trust would include Adams (1987), Alston (1996), Baier (1995a), Bishop (2007), Evans (1998), Kemp (1998), Niebuhr (1961), Penelhum (1995), Sessions’ (1994) “personal relationship model,” and Yandell’s (1990) “monotheistic faith,” among many others.

  6. In fact, I shall argue for a somewhat different set of differentiae below.

  7. I see no difference between relying and depending on someone (at least, not essentially). So, I shall use these terms interchangeably.

  8. I thank Jeff Jordan for pressing me on modifying my definition in this direction.

  9. I think that, quite often, ET will have an element of propositional belief and I take it that my account has no difficulty allowing that ET can ground belief-that. All I’m deny here is that the definition proposed requires ET involving strict propositional belief.

  10. I’m thinking of a case like Lackey’s (2006) private journal. I can steal someone’s journal and trust the person via the words therein even if the journal is ex hypothesi private and not intended to communicate.

  11. For a few accounts of trust emphasizing reliance, see: Anscombe (1979), Baier (1995a, c), Zagzebski (1996, p. 160), Hardwig (1991), Faulkner (2007a, b), among others.

  12. See Hardwig (1991) for a similar claim that the truster/hearer lacks adequate first-person reasons or evidence for beliefs based on trust.

  13. Again, philosophers have consistently linked trust and confidence. See: Baier’s (1980, 1995a, b), Zagzebski (2009), Smolkin (2008), and Jones (1996), among others.

  14. See, e.g., Kenny (1992), Kemp (1998), and Moser (2008), among others.

  15. See Kenny (1992) and Kemp (1998).

  16. I thank Terrence Tilley for these examples and pushing me to address this point.

  17. As with ET, I am not convinced that the object of faith must necessarily intend to communicate something in order for one to place one’s faith I that person. I suspect this is far less likely than with cases of ET, but I at least want to leave the possibility open. Let the ‘perceived’ modifier work sotto voce when I speak of ‘communication’ simpliciter in what follows.

  18. See, e.g., Pieper (1997), Sessions (1994), Schellenburg 2005, Niebuhr (1961), among others.

  19. See Schellenburg 2005, Audi (1991), and Niebuhr (1961).

  20. My view takes from Linda Zagzebski’s (2004) account of an emotion as a kind of affectively-loaded perception.

  21. E.g., Sessions (1994), Pieper (1997), and Moser (2010).

  22. Thanks to a referee of this journal for the examples.

  23. He also has a third feature of belief—intensity—that I do not think distinguishes faith from ET. Hence, I omit it here.

  24. Audi (2008, p. 89).

  25. I think David Hunt for this example.

  26. My thanks to an anonymous referee of this journal for suggesting this direction.

  27. See, e.g., Evans (1998), Penelhum (1995), Niebuhr (1961), and Chappell (1996).

  28. 2000, p. 4

  29. 2000, p. 106.

  30. 1990, p. 461.

  31. In fact, if one wanted to put ‘commitment’ under the broad conceptual umbrella of loyalty or fidelity that would not strike me as implausible or inappropriate.

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  1. Department of History, Political Science, Philosophy, and American Studies, University of South Carolina Upstate, 800 University Way, Spartanburg, SC, 29303, USA

    Benjamin W. McCraw

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McCraw, B.W. Faith and Trust. Int J Philos Relig 77, 141–158 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9481-2

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