Abstract
In a number of recent works, Nicholas Wolterstorff defends the claim that human rights inhere in the dignity of every human. He further contends that the explanation of this dignity cannot be found in the intrinsic features of humans; rather, the only plausible explanation for human dignity is that it is bestowed upon humans by God’s love. In this paper, I argue that Wolterstorff’s theory concerning the ground of human dignity falls prey to something quite similar to the classic Euthyphro dilemma: either God must love every existing human in a dignity-bestowing manner or he need not, and either option is problematic. If the former, then whatever it is about humans that ensures God’s love can reasonably be thought to be the independent source of human dignity and/or rights, thereby leaving us without cause to appeal to God’s love for the explanation of this dignity. If the latter, the implication is that moral statements which appear to be necessarily true are only contingently so. Wolterstorff’s theory will thus require substantial modification, or else abandonment.
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Notes
It might be more accurate to describe Wolterstorff’s concern as the grounding of inherent natural human rights—that is, the rights had on account of a being’s worth—not simply natural human rights. See Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 10–12. But since this qualifier is largely absent in Wolterstorff’s later works, we can safely leave it aside.
Wolterstorff’s emphasis (2011), pp. 147–148.
Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 321–322.
Wolterstorff also considers and rejects both Allan Gerwirth’s non-dignity based account of human rights as well as Ronald Dworkin’s account that does not ground dignity in human capacities. We will not examine Wolterstorff’s critique of Gerwirth’s account because this would take us too far afield; we will not discuss Dworkin’s account since Wolterstorff objects to it for reasons that are nearly identical to those he presses against the capacities accounts. See, Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 335–340 and 333–340.
See, Wolterstorff (2011), pp. 149–150.
For example, Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 329–333.
Wolterstorff most extensively defends the claim that the degree of dignity supervenes on the degree to which the capacity is possessed in (2011), p. 187.
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 189.
Ibid., p. 188.
Ibid., p. 189.
Wolterstorff (2011), p. 149.
Ibid., p. 150.
Ibid., p. 151.
Ibid., p. 152.
Ibid., p. 152.
For an argument along these lines, see Lee and George (2008).
Wolterstorff (2008), p. 351.
See Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 348–349.
Ibid., p. 351.
Ibid., p. 352.
Wolterstorff adds a third type of love, the love of benevolence (for example, Ibid., pp. 358–359). However, since the main and relevant contrast is between the love of attachment and the love of attraction, the love of benevolence need not presently detain us.
Ibid., p. 358.
Wolterstorff (2011), p. 153.
Wolterstorff (2008), p. 359.
Ibid., p. 359
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 155.
Wolterstorff (2008), p. 360.
In response to Wolterstorff (2008) Roger Crisp thus comments, ‘It seems unacceptable that God’s love should be considered arbitrary, so that, had he developed a special attachment to, say, rabbits, then rabbits would be worthy of special moral concern in a way that other beings are not.’ See Crisp (2010), p. 162.
Wolterstorff (2011), pp. 155–156.
My emphasis, Ibid., p. 156. I note, however, that Wolterstorff italicizes ‘explanation’ in the same portion of the argument in 2012, p. 200.
Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 352–353.
See, Wolterstorff (2008), pp. 360–361.
For example, Bernstein (2009).
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 199.
An argument along these lines is developed in more detail in Murphy (2011), pp. 116–124.
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 184. Along these lines Wolterstorff draws a distinction between the rights that are grounded in human worth and the rights that are grounded in the worth of personhood. Wolterstorff does not affirm that humans have equal worth and rights qua human person, as some humans function better as persons than others. See, especially, Ibid., pp. 214–216.
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 199.
For example, Lee and George (2008), pp. 81–94.
This example was in part given to me by Joshua Rasmussen.
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 182.
It is also worth mentioning that it is a cost of a view if it leaves a particular fact unexplained—better to have explanations where conceptually possible. So, were Wolterstorff to claim that it is just a brute fact of the divine nature that God must loving each and every human, Wolterstorff’s view would suffer this cost, even if the cost is not deemed to be prohibitive.
Ibid., p. 156.
See, Wolterstorff (2008), 5, pp. 293–296, and 386. This is not to say, however, that Wolterstorff’s theory does not have the resources for maintaining that one can have obligations concerning entities that do not have rights. On this last point see Ibid., pp. 381–382.
Ibid., pp. 304 and 370–373.
Wolterstorff’s emphasis, Ibid., p. 370.
Wolterstorff (2011), pp. 148–150.
Wolterstorff (2012), p. 186.
We could instead suppose that God simply chooses not to love any human at all, as either scenario will have the same implications relevant to my present purposes.
Wolterstorff (2008), p. 333, and (2011), p. 152. Also, if it is wrong to interpret Wolterstorff as suggesting that the features of a well functioning, mature chimpanzee would give him more intrinsic worth than a human with severe dementia, we could instead state that Sam is an infant with significant physical and mental disabilities.
Wolterstorff (2008), p. 302.
The following example is one that mirrors an example given by Wolterstorff in Ibid., p. 303.
Mike Rea pointed out to me that it is not just that well-formed chimpanzees possibly have greater inherent (or non-bestowed) worth than do humans with Alzheimer’s disease, it is rather an implication of Wolterstorff’s theory that it is presently true that inherent worth is distributed this way. No doubt, many will see this fact alone as sufficient reason to reject Wolterstorff’s theory concerning the ground of human dignity.
See Wolterstorff (2012), pp. 201–226.
References
Bernstein, R. J. (2009). Does he pull it off? A theistic grounding of natural inherent human rights? Journal of Religious Ethics, 37, 221–241.
Crisp, R. (2010). Rights, happiness and hod: A response to justice rights and wrongs. Studies in Christian Ethics, 23, 156–162.
Lee, P., & George, R. P. (2008). Body-self dualism in contemporary ethics and politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, M. C. (2011). God and moral law. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wolterstorff, N. (2008). Justice: Rights and wrongs. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wolterstorff, N. (2011). Justice in love. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Wolterstorff, N. (2012). Understanding liberal democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Pres.
Acknowledgments
Work for this project was supported by the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame. While I was a fellow at the Center, I unfairly subjected Robert Hartman and Tim Pawl to an extremely rough draft of this paper, and yet they graciously wadded through it and gave me excellent feedback. Many thanks are due to them—especially to Tim for continuing to help improve this paper despite the experience of having read the earlier draft. I must also thank Samuel Newlands, Faith Pawl, Joshua Rasmussen, and Bradley Rettler, all of whom helped improve this paper. Finally, I am grateful to Professor Wolterstorff for corresponding with me about the objections I have to his theistic ground of human rights. I have nothing but the highest regard for him and his philosophical work.
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Wessling, J. A dilemma for wolterstorff’s theistic grounding of human dignity and rights. Int J Philos Relig 76, 277–295 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9460-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9460-7