Abstract
To suggest that Daniel Dennett is a deist is to invite ridicule. Dennett is both an avowed atheist and defender of naturalism in philosophy. Yet if we pay heed to the entirety of Dennett’s claims a curious picture emerges. My suggestion is that Hegel and Marx represent the rival responses to what we might call the modern predicament: what is the nature of existence in a world which seems a mechanism? Dennett’s response to this question is Hegelian, and involves a commitment to a religiosity which might surprise those otherwise receptive to his arguments.
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