Abstract
We examine the ability of focal points to transform situations of potential conflict into situations of cooperation. In performing this function, focal points convert “worst-case scenarios” into “better-case scenarios,” which are easier for political economic systems to handle. Focal points thus contribute to the ability of political economies to perform well in the face of less than ideal conditions, enhancing systemic robustness.
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Leeson, P.T., Coyne, C.J. & Boettke, P.J. Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation. Rev Austrian Econ 19, 137–147 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-006-7345-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-006-7345-4