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Salvaging law and economics

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Some of Law and Economics’ pivotal claims have come to be criticized as a result of empirical findings that question their viability. Particularly, the premise that agents consistently act rationally and with their self-interest in mind seems problematic. What the consequences of the criticism mean for Law and Economics’ tenability depends largely on the questions whether (1) some elements are unassailable to the alternative’s objections and (2) the alternative is a systematic whole. It is argued that Law and Economics may be salvaged, if it is minimized and its ambitions are tempered. This means focusing on the stable, a priori, elements inherent to it.

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Correspondence to Jasper Doomen.

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Doomen, J. Salvaging law and economics. Qual Quant 47, 1943–1956 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-011-9635-6

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