Abstract
Recent studies of financial development have shown that the quality of institutions is an important determinant of international financial flows to a country. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining and comparing the effects of internal conflict and terrorism on domestic credits extended to the private sector by banks in developing countries. We use a panel dataset for 125 developing countries over the 1984–2012 period to explore the relationship between political instability and bank lending. Internal conflict negatively affects domestic bank credit to the private sector, and the extent of this impact depends on the degree of ethnic fractionalization. The impact of terrorism, however, is not statistically robust. Our findings are also relevant for the literature that investigates the costs of conflict.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) argue that, despite a significant contribution to total employment in many developing countries, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) face greater growth obstacles. In particular, limited access to credit for SMEs is a major growth constraint in these economies. Using survey data on firms in 69 developing countries, Leon (2015) shows a positive effect of bank competition on credit availability.
Other exogenous factors can make it difficult for firms to cooperate, even if some of them agree to compensate the firm that is most affected by conflicts. Examples of such factors could be: (1) a terror-ridden country may impose strenuous procedures for obtaining loans from banks; and (2) consumers may reduce current consumption spending owing to income uncertainties.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) offer an exhaustive discussion in this regard.
Gaibulloev et al. (2014), however, show that the average impact of terrorism on economic growth for a sample of world countries is not statistically significant.
As described by the World Bank (2014), “Domestic credit to the private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises”.
Although banks remain the largest source of lending for businesses and entrepreneurial activities, non-traditional loans can make up a sizeable portion of total lending. The sources of these loans may include friends and relatives, the Small Business Corporations, venture capital firms, and personal or corporate credit cards. Our analysis is limited to the bank lending owing to the lack of availability of data on nontraditional loans for the majority of developing countries.
The standard deviations for MEPV conflict and institutional risk are 1.74 and 13.16. Therefore, [EXP(−0.053 × 1.74) − 1] × 100 = 8.8 % and [EXP(−0.015 × 13.16) − 1] × 100 = 17.9 %.
The results for the other components of the institutional index—government stability, corruption, and democratic accountability—are not reported to save space. These components are not statistically significant and their inclusion does not affect our main conclusion (available upon request).
References
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2003). The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the Basque Country. American Economic Review, 93(1), 113–132.
Abadie, A., & Gardeazabal, J. (2008). Terrorism and the world economy. European Economic Review, 52(1), 1–27.
Adam, C., Collier, P., & Davies, V. B. (2008). Post-conflict monetary reconstruction. The World Bank Economic Review, 22(1), 87–112.
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155–194.
Aslam, F., & Kang, H. G. (2015). How different terrorist attacks affect stock market. Defence and Peace Economics, 26(6), 634–648.
Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., & Younas, J. (2011). Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy. Oxford Economic Papers, 63(3), 423–447.
Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., & Younas, J. (2014). Foreign direct investment, aid and terrorism. Oxford Economic Papers, 66(1), 25–50.
Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., & Younas, J. (2016). Trade and terrorism: A disaggregated approach. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2016-002A.
Bandyopadhyay, S., & Younas, J. (2011). Poverty, political freedom, and the roots of terrorism in developing countries: An empirical assessment. Economics Letters, 112(2), 171–175.
Barro, R. J., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2003). Economic growth (2nd ed.). Cambridge and London: MIT Press.
Beck, T., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2006). Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to finance as a growth constraint. Journal of Banking & Finance, 30(11), 2931–2943.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A., & Ross, L. (2007). Finance, inequality and the poor. Journal of Economic Growth, 12(1), 27–49.
Beck, T., Levine, R., & Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 58(1–2), 261–300.
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 3–57.
Blomberg, S. B., Hess, G. D., & Orphanides, A. (2004). The macroeconomic consequences of terrorism. Journal of Monetary Economics, 51(5), 1007–1032.
Chen, A. H., & Siems, T. F. (2004). The effects of terrorism on global capital markets. European Journal of Political Economy, 20(2), 349–366.
Collier, P. (1999). On the economic consequences of civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 51(1), 168–183.
Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Soderbom, M. (2008). Post-conflict risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45(4), 461–478.
Costalli, S., Moretti, L., & Pischedda, C. (2014). The economic costs of civil war: Synthetic counterfactual evidence and the effects of ethnic fractionalization. Households in Conflict Network Working paper No. 184, The Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics, 12(2), 77–99.
Enders, W., Sandler, T., & Gaibulloev, K. (2011). Domestic versus transnational terrorism: Data, decomposition, and dynamics. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 319–337.
Fafchamps, M. (2000). Ethnicity and credit in African manufacturing. Journal of Development Economics, 61(1), 205–235.
Fisman, R. J. (2003). Ethnic ties and the provision of credit: Relationship-level evidence from African firms. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 3(1), 1–18.
Frey, B., Luechniger, S., & Stutzer, A. (2009). The life satisfaction approach to valuing public good: The case for terrorism. Public Choice, 138(3), 317–345.
Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2008). Growth consequences of terrorism in Western Europe. Kyklos, 61(3), 411–424.
Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2009). The impact of terrorism and conflicts on growth in Asia. Economics and Politics, 21(3), 359–383.
Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2011). The adverse effect of transnational and domestic terrorism on growth in Africa. Journal of Peace Research, 48(3), 355–371.
Gaibulloev, K., Sandler, T., & Santifort, C. (2012). Assessing the evolving threat of terrorism. Global Policy, 3(2), 135–144.
Gaibulloev, K., Sandler, T., & Sul, D. (2014). Dynamic panel analysis under cross-sectional dependence. Political Analysis, 22(2), 258–273.
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993a). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 717–737.
King, R. G., & Levine, R. (1993b). Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth: Theory and evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 513–542.
Leon, F. (2015). Does bank competition alleviate credit constraints in developing countries? Journal of Banking & Finance, 57, 130–142.
Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American Economic Review, 88(3), 537–558.
Marshall, M. G., & Cole, B. R. (2014). Global report: Conflict, governance and state fragility. http://www.systemicpeace.org/. Accessed 5 July 2015.
Meierrieks, D., & Gries, T. (2013). Causality between terrorism and economic growth. Journal of Peace Research, 50(1), 91–104.
Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., & Sergenti, E. (2004). Economic shocks and civil conflict. Journal of Political Economy, 112(4), 725–753.
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2014). Global terrorism database. www.start.umd.edu/gtd. Accessed 14 June 2014.
Papaioannou, E. (2009). What drives international financial flows? Politics, institutions and other determinants. Journal of Development Economics, 88(2), 269–281.
Piplani, V., & Talmadge, C. (2015). When war helps civil-military relations: Prolonged interstate conflict and the reduced risk of coups. Forthcoming in Journal of Conflict Resolution,. doi:10.1177/0022002714567950.
Political Risk Services (PRS). (2014). International country risk guide dataset. PRS Group, New York. Documentation is available at http://epub.prsgroup.com/products/icrg.
Richards, D. L., & Gelleny, R. D. (2006). Banking crises, collective protest and rebellion. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 39(4), 777–801.
Rohner, D., Thoenig, M., & Zilibotti, F. (2013). Seeds of distrust: Conflict in Uganda. Journal of Economic Growth, 18(3), 217–252.
Sandler, T., & Enders, W. (2008). Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and developing countries: An overview. In P. Keefer & N. Loayza (Eds.), Terrorism, economic development and political openness (pp. 17–47). New York: Cambridge University Press.
World Bank. (2014). World development indicators. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Accessed 1 August 2015.
Younas, J. (2015). Does globalization mitigate the adverse effects of terrorism on growth? Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), 133–156.
Acknowledgments
While assuming full responsibility for any remaining shortcomings, the authors have profited by the comments from William F. Shughart II, Todd Sandler and an anonymous referee. We also received helpful comments from the seminar participants at the Political Violence and Policy Conference 2016 held at University of Texas-Dallas, Lahore University of Management Sciences and Middle East Economic Association Conference 2016 in San Francisco.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Electronic supplementary material
Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gaibulloev, K., Younas, J. Conflicts and domestic bank lending. Public Choice 169, 315–331 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0362-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0362-3