Abstract
Several recent studies suggest that transfers from central to regional governments are motivated by political considerations. In this paper we examine if this is also the case for transfers from regional to central governments in the context of the German fiscal equalization system. We examine the factors that contribute to differences in tax revenues across German states. The evidence indicates that both fiscal incentives and political factors can explain these differences, although in Germany the former are more important. Moreover, accounting for fiscal institutions has important consequences for the empirical assessment of political influences on taxation. Overall we find that the political affiliation of the state governor is an important factor in explaining differences in state tax revenues. Thus, the right-wing party (CDU/CSU) is effective in relaxing the tax burden at the state level. In contrast, partisan alignment between the state government and the federal government loses its importance once fiscal conditions enter the empirical model.
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Notes
The federal government’s share of revenues is 42.5 %, 50 % and around 51 %, respectively. Municipalities’ share of income and value-added taxes is 15 % and around 2 %, respectively.
For a more detailed description of the German fiscal equalization system, see Baretti et al. (2002).
The Christian Social Union (CSU) runs for elections in Bavaria. In all other states the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) runs for elections.
See Debus (2009) for a detailed description of party politics in Germany in recent decades.
Since the 2010 elections in Baden-Würtemberg the head of the state government has been a member of the Greens. However, this falls outside our sample period.
Though we could have used a weighted measure with weights according to the seats in parliament, anecdotal and theoretical evidence indicates that smaller coalition partners exert an impact on political decisions that goes beyond their proportional parliamentary representation. For example, they may use their veto power on issues that are core to their ideological program (Tsebelis 1995).
For the period from 2005 to the present, marginal tax rates can also be obtained from Fehr and Kindermann (2012).
If not stated otherwise, significance is interpreted as being at 5 %.
Interestingly, the alignment hypothesis between German central and state governments has also been confirmed by Müller (2009). However, his analysis does not include tax policies but economic and social policy positions in general. If the alignment effect is estimated unconditionally, i.e., by using a dummy variable to indicate that the state governor and federal chancellor come from the same party, the overall effect turns out to be negative with 10 % significance, whereas we do not find evidence for alignment effects conditional on right-wing affiliation.
The ‘joint degree of explanation’ of political variables z it say, is determined as the common R 2 in a regression of taxation on z it after partialling out all other right-hand-side variables.
Note, that these variables are not included in the analysis by Baretti et al. (2002). This may explain the different role that tax progression has in both our and their results. As mentioned before, states with larger proportions of younger or older people will spend more on social services. If we do not account for the effect of these variables, the resulting increase in effective taxation could be mistaken for more progressive taxation.
In terms of the definition used in (1) their additional regressor reads as \(\bar{\pi}_{\mathit{it}}=\bar{\tau}_{\mathit {it}}/\bar{y}_{\mathit{it}}\), with \(\bar{\tau}_{\mathit{it}}=\sum_{j=1,j \ne i}^{N} \tau_{jt} \) and \(\bar {y}_{\mathit{it}}=\sum_{j=1,j \ne i}^{N} y_{jt}\).
The corresponding 2.5 % and 97.5 % critical values for single variance ratios extracted from separate OLS regressions as in Model 3 are to be taken from an F(5,5) distribution and are 0.14 and 7.14, respectively. For Model 2, respective critical values are 0.248 and 4.03 according to an F(9,9) distribution.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Galina Zudenkova, Matthias Dahm, Christian Martin and two anonymous referees and the editor for their comments and suggestions. Carsten Schröder provided us with data on marginal tax rates. Thomas Bräuninger provided us with data on policy positions. We thank both for their support of this work. Bernd Theilen gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación under project ECO2010-17113.
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Appendix: Model diagnosis
Appendix: Model diagnosis
As argued, the GLS type model implementation takes into account both cross sectionally heterogeneous residual variances and first-order serial correlation. From diagnostic results provided in Table 3 it is evident that both distributional characteristics are relevant to a considerable fraction of cross-sectional entities. For instance, in the most comprehensive specification (Model 3), the residual variance ratio computed against the variance estimate for the first cross-sectional entity (Baden Würtemberg) varies between 0.315 and 8.211. A similar range of variance ratios (0.24 to 5.46) is documented for Model 2. Although we cannot provide critical values for these (joint) ratios under the assumption of cross-sectional homoscedasticity, it is most likely that variance heterogeneity is characteristic for our panel.Footnote 13 Moreover, according to a rule of thumb threshold of \(|2/\sqrt{T}|=|2/\sqrt {14}|=0.535\), up to eight out of 16 residual processes extracted from Models 1, 2 and 3 are characterized by significant first-order serial correlation. The evidence for both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation vanishes for the GLS residuals. First-order serial correlation might be present for only one (Hamburg) out of the 16 GLS residual processes used in Model 3. Consequently, we regard the estimation results from GLS regressions as the most reliable. In addition to GLS variants that take into account serial correlation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity we have also implemented panel designs that are based only on first-order serial correlation. The results of this model specification are qualitatively identical to those obtained from the more general specification of distributional properties. We do not provide these results for space considerations.
A further distributional characteristic is that residuals extracted from the common fixed effect within regressions of Model 3 display contemporaneous correlation. For instance, in absolute terms five (out of 120) cross correlation statistics exceed a critical value of 2.57 and, thus, hint at significance at the 1 % level. The evidence for contemporaneous correlation in the GLS residuals from Model 3 drops to three significant correlation estimates. Given that the empirical rejection rate for GLS residuals (2.5 %) is markedly closer to the nominal test level (1 %), we do not consider neglected cross correlation to be a serious matter of concern. Furthermore, given that the cross-sectional dimension of the investigated panel (N=16) exceeds the time dimension (T=14), we cannot account for cross sectional correlation without further a priori assumptions. Qualitatively similar results on the prevalence of cross sectional correlation hold with regard to the more restricted specifications of Model 1 and Model 2.
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Herwartz, H., Theilen, B. On the political and fiscal determinants of income redistribution under federalism and democracy: evidence from Germany. Public Choice 159, 121–139 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0031-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0031-0