Why is there no revolution in North Korea?
- Thomas Apolte
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The paper critically assesses the Acemoglu–Robinson approach to revolutions, as it is focused on inequality of wealth or income rather than on collective-action problems. We show that income inequality is not a sufficient and not even a necessary condition for a revolution to occur. Rather, a necessary condition for a revolution is that any subpopulation can expect net benefits from it, for which inequality is not a precondition. As a result, a certain structure of commitment devices or their absence rather than inequality is crucial for explaining why revolutions sometimes occur and sometimes not.
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- Why is there no revolution in North Korea?
Volume 150, Issue 3-4 , pp 561-578
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- Thomas Apolte (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. CIW Center for Interdisciplinary Economics, University of Münster, 48151, Münster, Germany