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Economic freedom, culture, and growth

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Abstract

How do economic freedom and culture impact economic growth? This paper argues that culture, as measured by the World Values Surveys, and economic institutions associated with economic freedom are both independently important for economic prosperity, but the strength of their impact can be better understood only when both are included in the growth regression. Our results indicate that economic freedom is more important than culture for growth outcomes, suggesting substitutability between the two. We posit that culture is important for growth when economic freedom is absent, diminishing in significance once economic freedom is established.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Development Research Institute, Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY, 10012, USA

    Claudia R. Williamson

  2. Charles G. Koch Doctoral Fellow, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, 26506, USA

    Rachel L. Mathers

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  1. Claudia R. Williamson
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  2. Rachel L. Mathers
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Correspondence to Claudia R. Williamson.

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Williamson, C.R., Mathers, R.L. Economic freedom, culture, and growth. Public Choice 148, 313–335 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9656-z

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