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Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments

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Abstract

Analysis of the economic effects of constitutional rules has made substantial progress over the last decade. This survey provides an overview of this rapidly growing research area and also discusses a number of methodological issues and identifies underresearched areas. It argues that the next logical step of positive constitutional economics is to endogenize constitutional rules.

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Voigt, S. Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments. Public Choice 146, 205–256 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9638-1

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