Date: 11 Mar 2010
A Noble prize in practical politics: Elinor Ostrom
- Mark Lichbach
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- A Noble prize in practical politics: Elinor Ostrom
Volume 143, Issue 3-4 , pp 309-315
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer US
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- Collective action
- Collective choice
- Industry Sectors
- Mark Lichbach (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Political Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 20742, USA