Abstract
This paper considers a common n-agent symmetric rent-seeking game. It derives conditions so that risk-aversion and risk always decrease rent-seeking efforts. These conditions hold for any regular contest success function when risk-averse rent-seekers are also prudent. Under n=2, prudence is a necessary and sufficient condition for risk-aversion to decrease rent-seeking efforts compared to risk-neutrality. An intuition for this result is given based on a self-protection model.
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Treich, N. Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games. Public Choice 145, 339–349 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9569-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9569-x