Abstract
Using historical, theoretical and empirical arguments, this paper puts forth the notion that it was the rise of US national TV networks in the late 1960s that led to the expansion of federal social regulation and a simultaneous decline of federal economic regulation in the 1970s. The paper argues that national TV networks changed the relative position of national versus local and regional producers and sellers of goods and services. Instead of preferring state and local social regulation, the emerging national firms preferred federal social regulation. Since national markets were emerging, the same national firms lobbied for regulatory reform in transportation and communication services. The rise of national markets associated with national TV networks also stimulated a demand for mergers and consolidations. Data describing these various phenomena are provided in the paper.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bain, J. S. (1968). Industrial organization. New York: Wiley.
Blair, J. M. (1972). Economic concentration. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
Buchanan, J. M., Tollison, R. D., Tullock, G. (1980). Theory of the rent-seeking society. Bryan: Texas A&M Press.
Christensen, C. M. (1997). The innovator’s dilemma. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Christensen, G. B., & Haveman, R. H. (1984). The Reagan administration’s regulatory relief effort: a mid-term assessment. In G. C. Eads & M. Fix (Eds.), The Reagan regulatory strategy: an assessment (pp. 49–83). Washington: The Urban Institute.
Derthick, M., & Quirk, P. J. (1985). The politics of deregulation. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Economic Report of the President, 2004. Washington: Government Printing Office.
Fischer, D. H. (1996). The great wave. New York: Oxford University Press.
Higgs, R. (1987). Crisis and leviathan. New York: Oxford Press.
High, J. (1991). Regulation: economic theory and history. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Hughes, J. (1990). American economic history. Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Co.
Kendrick, J. W. (1984). The implications of growth accounting models. In C. R. Hulten & I. V. Sawhill (Eds.), The legacy of reaganomics (pp. 19–43). Washington: The Urban Institute.
Litan, R. E., & Nordhaus, W. D. (1983). Reforming federal regulation. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mahoney, P. G. (2001). The common law and economic growth: Hayek might be right. Journal of Legal Studies, 30, 503–525.
Mashaw, J. L., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (1984). Federalism and regulation. In G. C. Eads & M. Fix (Eds.), The Reagan regulatory strategy: an assessment (pp. 11–12). Washington: The Urban Institute.
McCraw, T. K. (1984). Prophets of regulation (pp. 303–304). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University.
Miller, J. C., Yandle, B. (1979). Benefit-cost analysis of social regulation. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
Olson, M. (1984). Ideology and economic growth. In C. R. Hulten & I. V. Sawhill (Eds.), The legacy of reaganomics (pp. 229–251). Washington: The Urban Institute Press.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics, 83(August–December), 677–725.
Peltzman, S. (1989). The economic theory of regulation after a decade of deregulation. Brookings Microeconomic Papers, 1–59.
Staff, Antitrust Subcommittee (1971). Committee on the Judiciary, House of Represenatives, 92nd Congress, First Session. Investigation of Conglomerate Mergers, Washington, US Government Printing Office.
Stigler, G. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal, Spring, 3–21.
Tollison, R. D. (1991). Regulation and interest groups. In J. High (Ed.), Regulation: economic theory and history (pp. 59–76). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Vogel, S. K. (1996). Freer markets, more rules. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wolff, E. N. (1985). The magnitude and causes of recent productivity slowdowns in the united states. In W. J. Baumol & K. McLennan (Eds.), Productivity growth and US competitiveness (pp. 29–69). New York: Oxford University Press.
Yandle, B. (1983). Bootleggers and baptists: the education of a regulatory economist. Regulation, May/June, 12–16.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Yandle, B. National TV broadcasting and the rise of the regulatory state. Public Choice 142, 339–353 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9547-3
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9547-3