Abstract
This paper is part of a book symposium on my Judgment and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2015). Here I reply to the comments of three commentators: Jason Baehr, Imogen Dickie, and Hilary Kornblith.
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Notes
Baehr notes that others, such as Julia Driver and Linda Zagzebski, have adopted reliabilism for intellectual virtues, which I of course welcome.
Competence Virtue Epistemology focuses on attempts, which can be Accurate (successful), Adroit (competent), and Apt (where the success manifests the competence exercised).
Thus, a judgment-constitutive affirmation must not only alethically aim at truth but also at its apt attainment, through competence and not just luck.
References
Descartes, R. (1985). Meditations on first philosophy (trans: Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. & Murdoch, D.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, H. (1971). Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. The Journal of Philosophy, 68(1), 5–20.
Acknowledgments
First my warm thanks to all three commentators for lucid and engaging comments. I hope to rise to the occasion, though the bar is set high!
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Sosa, E. Replies to comments on Judgment and Agency . Philos Stud 174, 2599–2611 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0733-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0733-0