Abstract
Soames's new theory of "cognitive propositions" is presented and several prima facie objections are presented to it.
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I’m being very sloppy here in my use of ‘φ’. If Jane predicates doghood of Fido, we can’t say that Jane is entertaining the proposition that Fido is doghood; we have to say instead that she’s entertaining the proposition that Fido is a dog. I trust, however, that I can be understood without going into the spiel that would be needed in order for me to use a sentence that really does require me to say what I’m confident my sloppy use of words conveys.
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Schiffer, S. Cognitive propositions. Philos Stud 173, 2551–2563 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0634-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0634-2