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Schwitzgebel, E. Reply to Kriegel, Smithies, and Spener. Philos Stud 165, 1195–1206 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0152-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0152-4