, Volume 162, Issue 1, pp 35-42
Date: 25 Jul 2012

Do we perceive natural kind properties?

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I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.

High-level properties

There are lots of properties which human beings cannot visually detect. As a matter of necessity, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect a range of sensory low-level properties detectable by other sense modalities. I cannot visually detect the coldness of ice cream, the sweetness of strawberries, the softness of your skin, or the pitch of your voice. And, as a matter of contingent fact, (normal) human beings cannot visually detect low-level properties instantiated exclusively by very large objects, very small objects and objects very far away. Assuming that no other object on ...

Presented at the ANU, 2009 and the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA, San Francisco, 2010.