Abstract
This article is composed of three parts. In the first part of the article I take up a question raised by Susanna Siegel (Philosophical Review 115: 355–388, 2006a). Siegel has argued that subjects have the following anticipation: (PC) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will change as a result of this change. She has left it an open question as to whether subjects anticipate a specific kind of change. I take up this question and answer it in the affirmative. By appealing to a widely held view of perceptual content, the view that we represent ‘factual’ properties in perception, I argue that (PC) can be refined as follows: (PC’) If S substantially changes her perspective on o, her visual phenomenology will present different views of o’s factual properties. In the second part of the article I argue that (PC’) implies that there are cases in which normal perceivers have different perceptual content under identical viewing conditions. The differences in perceptual content are due to differences in the determinacy of visual anticipation. I draw the conclusion that perceptual content is rich in the sense that it includes a unique contribution from individual perceivers. In the final part of the article, I discuss some open issues regarding the way in which (PC’) relates to the personal/sub-personal distinction, empirical models, and the distinction between perception and cognition.
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Notes
I follow the convention in the contemporary literature of using ‘content’ to mean representational content, or, more precisely, an information state with correctness conditions (Peacocke 1983, p. 5).
I take the term ‘factual content’ from Noë (2004).
Many who accept this view also accept that we represent a special kind of property which does depend on our particular location and viewing conditions. Gilbert Harman (1990) and Michael Tye (2000) have suggested that we represent properties of things ‘from here.’ Alva Noë has suggested that we represent ‘perspectival properties.’ Sydney Shoemaker (2006) has suggested that we represent ‘appearance properties,’ and Susanna Schellenberg (2008) has suggested that we represent ‘situation-dependent properties.’ Whether or not one accepts this additional commitment does not bear upon the main issue here.
In defending weak representationalism, Michael Tye argues that there is non-conceptual representational content to an after-image (2000, p. 85). It is plausible to read Tye’s distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content as mapping onto the distinction between factual and perspectival content, especially considering his discussion of the tilted coin (2000, pp. 78–79). If this reading is correct, then it seems likely that Tye would accept that there can be phenomenal experiences without factual content.
See Madary (2012) for the details of where these ideas can be found in Husserl’s work.
Granting that there is self-identity over time for subjects.
See Kveraga et al. (2007) for a review.
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Acknowledgments
An early version of this paper was presented in Copenhagen at the Center for Subjectivity Research and in Frankfurt at the 13th Mind Group Meeting. I am grateful to both audiences for helpful comments. I also thank the Mainz Journal Club for providing helpful feedback on a draft. I thank Adrian Alsmith, Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Thomas Metzinger, Jennifer Windt, and Dan Zahavi for detailed comments. The visit to Copenhagen was funded by the AHRC under the ESF Eurocores CONTACT project. Subsequent research has been supported by the EC Project VERE, funded under the EU 7th Framework Program, Future and Emerging Technologies (Grant 257695).
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Madary, M. Anticipation and variation in visual content. Philos Stud 165, 335–347 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9926-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9926-3