Date: 17 Feb 2012
Killing, wrongness, and equality
- Carlos Soto
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This paper examines accounts of the moral wrongness of killing persons in addition to determining what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the morality of killing persons about the (in)equality of persons, and vice versa. I will argue that a plausible way of thinking about the moral wrongness of killing implies that the permissibility of killing innocent, nonthreatening persons depends on a person’s age. I address objections to this conclusion and discuss some potential implications of the view.
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- Killing, wrongness, and equality
Volume 164, Issue 2 , pp 543-559
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
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- Carlos Soto (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA