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Shibboleth: some comments on William Fish’s Perception, Hallucination & Illusion

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Notes

  1. This article was written for a symposium at the Pacific APA in Seattle April 2012. I am grateful to Bill Fish and Adam Pautz for discussion there; and to Christopher Peacocke and Richard Price for older discussions of some of this material.

  2. See Austin (1962), Hinton (1967, 1973), Snowdon (1980–1981, 1990), McDowell (1982).

  3. Siegel’s objections are to be found in (Siegel 2008).

  4. For example, one might note the literature that has arisen out of (Mack and Rock 1998), and the vigorous debate concerning recent interpretations of Sperling’s work on iconic memory and Lamme’s recent revision of it, in, for example, (Block 2007), and the various responses to it in the literature.

  5. This line of defence of externalism has been pressed most notably by Christopher Peacocke (see Peacocke 1993), and Timothy Williamson (see Williamson 1995, 1998, 2000). For an earlier scepticism on whether an internalist conception of content can mirror the explanatory role of contents see also Robert Stalnaker’s papers (Stalnaker 1989, 1990).

  6. See Martin (2002).

  7. Fish is addressing Robinson’s discussion of belief analyses of perception in (Robinson 1994, p. 51).

  8. See Siegel (2004, 2008), Farkas (2006), and Sturgeon (2008).

  9. See Martin (2006).

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  1. UCL, London, UK

    M. G. F. Martin

  2. UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    M. G. F. Martin

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Martin, M.G.F. Shibboleth: some comments on William Fish’s Perception, Hallucination & Illusion . Philos Stud 163, 37–48 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0075-5

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