Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis
- Susanna Siegel
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Reply to John Campbell
A straightforward way to challenge the Content View is to argue that there could be a visual perceptual experience that doesn’t have any contents. Since my type of experience contents have to be conveyed to the subject, and since I say those contents can be derived from the properties presented in experience, a way to pose this type of challenge is by giving a case in which a subject consciously experiences some properties, but those properties are not conveyed to the subject. Campbell tries to block the Content View in this way, by arguing that some creatures as a matter of course consciously experience properties, while those properties are not conveyed to them.
The conveying constraint says that for something to be a content of experience, it has to actually be conveyed to the subject. But being actually conveyed is itself a modal condition, consisting in being available for one of three functions: guiding action, belief-formation, and introspection. The conveyi
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- Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis
Volume 163, Issue 3 , pp 847-865
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- Susanna Siegel (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA