, Volume 163, Issue 3, pp 847-865
Date: 26 Aug 2012

Replies to Campbell, Prinz, and Travis

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access
This is an excerpt from the content

Reply to John Campbell

A straightforward way to challenge the Content View is to argue that there could be a visual perceptual experience that doesn’t have any contents. Since my type of experience contents have to be conveyed to the subject, and since I say those contents can be derived from the properties presented in experience, a way to pose this type of challenge is by giving a case in which a subject consciously experiences some properties, but those properties are not conveyed to the subject. Campbell tries to block the Content View in this way, by arguing that some creatures as a matter of course consciously experience properties, while those properties are not conveyed to them.

The conveying constraint says that for something to be a content of experience, it has to actually be conveyed to the subject. But being actually conveyed is itself a modal condition, consisting in being available for one of three functions: guiding action, belief-formation, and introspection. The conveyi ...