- Eric Vogelstein
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It is a platitude that morality is normative, but a substantive and interesting question whether morality is normative in a robust and important way; and although it is often assumed that morality is indeed robustly normative, that view is by no means uncontroversial, and a compelling argument for it is conspicuously lacking. In this paper, I provide such an argument. I argue, based on plausible claims about the relationship between moral wrongs and moral criticizability, and the relationship between criticizability and normative reasons, that moral facts necessarily confer normative reasons upon moral agents.
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Volume 165, Issue 3 , pp 1083-1095
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- Eric Vogelstein (1)
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- 1. Jefferson College of Health Sciences, 101 Elm Ave. SE, Roanoke, VA, 24013, USA