Philosophical Studies

, Volume 164, Issue 1, pp 233–254

What is nonconceptualism in Kant’s philosophy?

Authors

    • The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9851-x

Cite this article as:
de Sá Pereira, R.H. Philos Stud (2013) 164: 233. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9851-x

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content.

Keywords

Sensible intuitionNon-conceptualismDirect referenceDe re mode of presentation

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012