Abstract
I provide an account of the nature of seemings that explains why they are necessary for justification. The account grows out of a picture of cognition that explains what is required for epistemic agency. According to this account, epistemic agency requires (1) possessing the epistemic aims of forming true beliefs and avoiding errors, and (2) having some means of forming beliefs in order to satisfy those aims. I then argue that seeming are motives for belief characterized by their role of providing us with doxastic instructions guided by our epistemic aims. Understanding the nature of seemings allows us to underwrite recent epistemological work by Michael Huemer, and shows why he was right to claim that seemings are the source of all justification. I then look at some objections both to my arguments regarding the connection between seemings and justification, and to Huemer’s related “Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism”.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
While some people are interested in (PC) as a principle of externalist justification as well, Huemer (2001, p. 104) states that the principle deals with internalist justification.
Not all versions of internalism focus on our epistemic goals in this manner. Since Huemer’s version clearly does, however (see, e. g., 2001, p. 115), I will be focusing on such versions of internalism here.
I say “typically” because sometime we make affirmations without making judgments, such as in cases of wishful thinking or in cases of arbitrary belief formation.
This seems to be what Huemer has in mind when he claims “If PC is false, so that the way things seem to oneself is irrelevant to epistemic justification, then all judgment must be irrational” (Huemer 2001, p. 107).
Given the above argument, if this is the case, then only those remaining seemings could ever provide justification for our beliefs.
This claim should not be confused with the claim that it would make the initial seeming stop occurring. The same content can appear to be true when considered in some ways and not seem to be true when considered in others. Consider, for example, the apparent length of the lines in a Muller-Lyer appear when you look at them compared to their apparent lengths when you measure them.
The relata of this identity statement are motivations, or reasons for belief.
Huemer explains in the article why each version of internalism should adopt such a principle. Versions of internalism that reject deontogical accounts of justification, however, may be resistant to such a principle, and this response would likely not be available to those who would reject such a conception of internalism. I will say more in defense of deontological views later in the paper.
For a comprehensive discussion of the various types of epistemic evaluation we may be interested in, see Alston’s (2005).
In fact, when it comes to pain, I’m not sure the view is even coherent, since seeming to be in pain may well be partially constitutive of the phenomenology of experiencing pain, but I won’t press this point here.
This reply may not be sufficient for those who advocate additional positions Bergmann endorses, including what he calls “objectivity,” nor for those who may be motivated to endorse contingency for other reasons. Bergmann’s case of the brain-damaged human (2006, 120; ms, section II), for example, may not be subject to this reply. However, that example requires not just contingency, but the view that some doxastic responses are objectively fitting or unfitting independently of one’s available evidence. Since such a principle seems to be a straightforward denial of (CII), I have set it aside as well as related concerns, since I see no reason for an advocate of (PC) to endorse such a principle. For Bergmann’s treatment of objectivity, see (2006, esp. pp. 114–116).
This appeal to modes of presentation seems to be what Huemer was getting at when he referred to the differences between types of speech in describing the nature of apprehensions in the quote in Sect. 4.
These examples are from Ryan (2003, pp. 63, 65–67), respectively.
References
Alston, W. (2005). Beyond “justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic evaluation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without awareness. New York: Oxford University Press.
BonJour, L. (2004). In search of direct realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(2), 349–367.
DePoe, J. M. (2009). Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9482-7.
Frankfurt, H. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–839.
Heller, M. (2000). Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conception of Justification”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81.
Huemer, M. (1999). The problem of memory knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80, 130–141.
Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanaham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical intuitionism. New York: Palgrave MacMillian.
Huemer, M. (2006). Phenomenal conservatism and the internalist intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(2), 147–158.
Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74, 30–55.
Hume, D. (2002). Enquiry concerning human understanding. Reprinted In M. Huemer (Ed.) Epistemology, contemporary readings (p. 47). New York: Routledge.
Markie, P. (2006). Epistemically appropriate perceptual belief. Nous, 40, 1.
Mill, J. S. (2009) Utilitarianism. In S. M. Cahn & P. Markie (Eds.), Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues, 4e. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reid, T. (1969). Essays on the active powers of the human mind. In Charleston, MA: MIT Press.
Reid, T. (2002) Essays on the intellectual powers of man. In D. R. Brookes (Ed.), A critical edition. University Park: Penn St. University Press.
Ryan, S. (2003). Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief. Philosophical Studies, 114, 47–49.
Steup, M. (2004). Internalist reliabilism. Philosophical Issues, 14, 403–425.
Acknowledgements
This paper has been greatly improved as a result of extensive and valuable feedback. I would especially like to thank Michael Huemer, Kris McDaniel, Andre Gallois, an anonymous reviewer for this journal, and the participants at an ABD presentation at Syracuse University for comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Skene, M. Seemings and the possibility of epistemic justification. Philos Stud 163, 539–559 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9830-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9830-2