Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 2, pp 359–365

A pragmatic solution to Ostertag’s puzzle

Authors

    • Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of California, Santa Barbara
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9819-x

Cite this article as:
Atkins, P. Philos Stud (2013) 163: 359. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9819-x

Abstract

Gary Ostertag (Philos Stud 146:249–267, 2009) has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s (Frege’s puzzle, 1986) pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.

Keywords

RussellianismBelief reportsFrege’s puzzleSemanticsPragmatics

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011