Objective consequentialism and the licensing dilemma
- Vuko Andrić
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Frank Jackson has put forward a famous thought experiment of a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient. Subjective consequentialism tells the physician to do what intuitively seems to be the right action, whereas objective consequentialism fails to guide the physician’s action. I suppose that objective consequentialists want to supplement their theory so that it guides the physician’s action towards what intuitively seems to be the right treatment. Since this treatment is wrong according to objective consequentialism, objective consequentialists have to license it without calling it right. I consider eight strategies to spell out the idea of licensing the intuitively right treatment and argue that objective consequentialism is on the horns of what I call the licensing dilemma: Either the physician’s action is not guided towards the intuitively right treatment. Or the guidance towards the intuitively right treatment is ad hoc in some respect or the other.
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- Objective consequentialism and the licensing dilemma
Volume 162, Issue 3 , pp 547-566
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Objective consequentialism
- Subjective consequentialism
- Frank Jackson
- Licensing dilemma
- Vuko Andrić (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Universität Konstanz, Zukunftskolleg, Postfach 216, 78457, Konstanz, Germany