Interpretation and knowledge maximization
- Aidan McGlynn
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Timothy Williamson has proposed that we should give a ‘knowledge first’ twist to David Lewis’s account of content, maintaining that for P to be the content of one’s belief is for P to be the content that would be attributed by an idealized interpreter working under certain constraints, and that the fundamental constraint on interpretation is a principle of knowledge maximization. According to this principle, an interpretation is correct to the extent that it maximizes the number of knowledgeable judgments the subject comes out as making. Here I will argue against knowledge maximization and two fallback positions suggested by Williamson’s discussion. Williamson intends the principle of knowledge maximization to form the basis of an argument against a certain sort of skepticism about judgment. In the final section I argue that the kind of general response to judgment skepticism envisaged by Williamson is neither desirable nor necessary.
- Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67–90. CrossRef
- Davidson, D. (1983). A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In D. Henrich (Ed.), Kant oder Hegel? (pp. 423–438). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Grandy, R. (1973). Reference, meaning, and belief. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 439–452. CrossRef
- Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horgan, T. (1995). Transvaluationism: A Dionysian approach to vagueness. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33(supplement), 97–126. CrossRef
- Lewis, D. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lewis, D. (1974). Radical interpretation. Synthese, 23, 331–344. CrossRef
- Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 12, 3–35.
- Martin, M. G. F. (2009). Reupholstering a discipline: Comments on Williamson. Philosophical Studies, 145, 445–453. CrossRef
- Pritchard, D. (2009). Safety-based epistemology: Whither now? Journal of Philosophical Research, 34, 33–45.
- Sainsbury, R. M. (1997). Easy possibilities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57, 907–919. CrossRef
- Sainsbury, R. M. (2005). Reference without referents. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
- Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weatherson, B. (2004). Luminous margins. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, 373–383. CrossRef
- Williamson, T. (1996). Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review, 105, 489–523. CrossRef
- Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, T. (2004). Philosophical ‘Intuition’ and skepticism about judgment. Dialectica, 58, 109–153. CrossRef
- Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. CrossRef
- Williamson, T. (2009a). Replies to critics. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on knowledge (pp. 282–384). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Williamson, T. (2009b). Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg. Philosophical Studies, 145, 465–476. CrossRef
- Interpretation and knowledge maximization
Volume 160, Issue 3 , pp 391-405
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Aidan McGlynn (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, Old Brewery, High Street, Aberdeen, AB24 3UB, UK