Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 2, pp 299–319

On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyConcordia University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9709-2

Cite this article as:
Lavers, G. Philos Stud (2012) 159: 299. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9709-2

Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine’s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.

Keywords

CarnapQuineAnalyticityExplicationMathematics

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011