Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 2, pp 277–291

Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure

Authors

    • School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious StudiesArizona State University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9707-4

Cite this article as:
Blackson, T.A. Philos Stud (2012) 159: 277. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9707-4

Abstract

I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form “S is pleased/glad that P” and “S is displeased/sad that P” should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman’s examples. My interpretation is plausible in its own right. Moreover, it is significant within the context of the debate. It allows the attitudinal hedonist to preserve the initial understanding of happiness that Feldman believes is open to counterexample: that happiness is the sum of attitudinal pleasure minus attitudinal displeasure and that all attitudinal pleasure and displeasure counts equally in the aggregation that constitutes happiness.

Keywords

Intrinsic attitudinal pleasure Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure Attitudinal hedonism The problem of double-counting Fred Feldman’s theory of happiness Feature liking State liking Elijah Millgram’s theory of practical induction John Pollock’s theory of evaluative induction

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011