Date: 20 Jan 2011
Changing minds in a changing world
- Wolfgang Schwarz
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
I defend a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject’s location. The rule combines standard conditioning with a “shifting” operation that moves the center of each doxastic possibility forward to the next point where information arrives. I show that well-known arguments for conditioning lead to this combination when centered information is taken into account. I also discuss how my proposal relates to other recent proposals, what results it delivers for puzzles like the Sleeping Beauty problem, and whether there are diachronic constraints on rational belief at all.
Albrecht, A., & Sorbo, L. (2004). Can the universe afford inflation? Physical Review D, 70, 063, 528.CrossRef
Arntzenius, F. (2003). Some problems for conditionalization and reflection. Journal of Philosophy, 100, 356–370.
Christensen, D. (1994). Conservatism in epistemology. Noûs, 28(1), 69–89.CrossRef
Diaconis, P., & Zabell, S. L. (1982). Updating subjective probability. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 77, 822–830.CrossRef
Elga, A. (2000). Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem. Analysis, 60, 143–147.CrossRef
Elga, A. (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69, 383–396.CrossRef
Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 48(1), 15–34.
Goldstein, M. (1983). The prevision of a prevision. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 78, 817–819.CrossRef
Halpern, J. (2006). Sleeping Beauty reconsidered: conditioning and reflection in asynchronous systems. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 1, pp. 111–142). Oxford University Press.
Jeffrey, R. (1983). The logic of decision (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Katsuno, H., & Mendelzon, A. (1991). On the difference between updating a knowledge database and revising it. In Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on principles of knowledge representation and reasoning (KR-92). pp. 387–394.
Kim, N. (2009). Sleeping Beauty and shifted jeffrey conditionalization. Synthese, 168, 295–312.CrossRef
Kumar, P. R., & Varaiya, P. (1986). Stochastic systems. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
LaValle, S. M. (2006). Planning algorithms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRef
Lewis, D. (1979). Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. The Philosophical Review, 88, 513–543.CrossRef
Lewis, D. (1999). Why conditionalize? In Papers in metaphysics and epistemology (pp. 403–407). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meacham, C. (2008) Sleeping Beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs. Philosophical Studies, 138, 245–269.CrossRef
Meacham, C. (2010) Unravelling the tangled web: Continuity, internalism, non-uniqueness and self-locating beliefs. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 86–125). Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. (1979) The problem of the essential indexical. Noûs, 13, 3–21.CrossRef
Piccione, M., & Rubinstein, A. (1997). On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 20, 3–24.CrossRef
Stalnaker, R. (2008) Our knowledge of the internal world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
Teller, P. (1973). Conditionalization and observation. Synthese, 26(2), 218–258.
Titelbaum, M. G. (2008). The relevance of self-locating beliefs. The Philosophical Review, 117, 555–606.CrossRef
Vahid, H. (2004). Varieties of epistemic conservatism. Synthese, 141(1), 97–122.
van Fraassen, B. (1984). Belief and the will. Journal of Philosophy, 81(5), 235–256.CrossRef
van Fraassen, B. (1999). Conditionalization, a new argument for. Topoi , 18(2), 93–96.
Williams, P. M. (1980). Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 31(2), 131–144.CrossRef
- Changing minds in a changing world
Volume 159, Issue 2 , pp 219-239
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Belief revision
- Centered worlds
- Wolfgang Schwarz (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. RSSS School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia