- Matthew Kotzen
- … show all 1 hide
Rent the article at a discountRent now
* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.Get Access
Nico Silins has proposed and defended a form of Liberalism about perception that, he thinks, is a good compromise between the Dogmatism of Jim Pryor and others, and the Conservatism of Roger White, Crispin Wright, and others. In particular, Silins argues that his theory can explain why having justification to believe the negation of skeptical hypotheses is a necessary condition for having justification to believe ordinary propositions, even though (contra the Conservative) the latter is not had in virtue of the former. I argue that Silins's explanation is unsuccessful, and hence that we should prefer either White/Wright-style Conservatism (which can explain this necessary condition) or Pryor-style Dogmatism (which denies that this is a necessary condition).
- Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. Philosophical Review, 119, 187–217. CrossRef
- Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. Nous, 41, 478–502. CrossRef
- Feldman, R. (2006). Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In S. Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology futures (pp. 216–236). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Feldman, R. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreement. In L. Antony (Ed.), Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the secular life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, T. (2005). The Epistemic significance of disagreement. In S. John & G. S. Tamar (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 1, pp. 167–196). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelly, T. (2010). Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In R. Feldman & T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kotzen, M. (manuscript). A formal account of epistemic defeat. Available at http://matthewkotzen.net/matthewkotzen.net/Research_files/defeatersweb.pdf.
- Pryor, J. (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs, 34, 517–549. CrossRef
- Silins, N. (2008). Basic justification and the Moorean response to the skeptic. In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 2, pp. 108–142). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- White, R. (2006). Problems for dogmatism. Philosophical Studies, 131, 525–557. CrossRef
- Wright, C. (2002). (Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2), 330–348. CrossRef
- Wright, C. (2004). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? Aristotelian Society Supplement, 78, 167–212. CrossRef
- Wright, C. (2008). The perils of dogmatism. In S. Nuccetelli & G. Seay (Eds.), Themes from G. E. Moore: New essays in epistemology and ethics (pp. 25–48). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Silins’s Liberalism
Volume 159, Issue 1 , pp 61-68
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Liberalism about perception
- Conservatism about perception
- Matthew Kotzen (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA