Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 1, pp 61-68

First online:

Silins’s Liberalism

  • Matthew KotzenAffiliated withUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Email author 

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Nico Silins has proposed and defended a form of Liberalism about perception that, he thinks, is a good compromise between the Dogmatism of Jim Pryor and others, and the Conservatism of Roger White, Crispin Wright, and others. In particular, Silins argues that his theory can explain why having justification to believe the negation of skeptical hypotheses is a necessary condition for having justification to believe ordinary propositions, even though (contra the Conservative) the latter is not had in virtue of the former. I argue that Silins's explanation is unsuccessful, and hence that we should prefer either White/Wright-style Conservatism (which can explain this necessary condition) or Pryor-style Dogmatism (which denies that this is a necessary condition).


Liberalism about perception Conservatism about perception Dogmatism