Philosophical Studies

, Volume 158, Issue 1, pp 1–15

Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyFlorida State University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9662-5

Cite this article as:
Capes, J.A. Philos Stud (2012) 158: 1. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9662-5

Abstract

Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.

Keywords

ActionFree willMoral responsibilityAlternative possibilitiesFrankfurt-style cases

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010