Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise
- Justin A. Capes
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Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
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- Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise
Volume 158, Issue 1 , pp 1-15
- Cover Date
- Print ISSN
- Online ISSN
- Springer Netherlands
- Additional Links
- Free will
- Moral responsibility
- Alternative possibilities
- Frankfurt-style cases
- Justin A. Capes (1)
- Author Affiliations
- 1. Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, 151 Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-1500, USA