Action, responsibility and the ability to do otherwise Authors
First Online: 03 November 2010 DOI:
10.1007/s11098-010-9662-5 Cite this article as: Capes, J.A. Philos Stud (2012) 158: 1. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9662-5 Abstract
Here it is argued that in order for something someone “does” to count as a genuine action, the person needn’t have been able to refrain from doing it. If this is right, then two recent defenses of the principle of alternative possibilities, a version of which says that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have refrained from doing it, are unsuccessful.
Keywords Action Free will Moral responsibility Alternative possibilities Frankfurt-style cases References
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