Article

Philosophical Studies

, Volume 157, Issue 2, pp 267-285

Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle

  • Dale DorseyAffiliated withDepartment of Philosophy, University of Kansas Email author 

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Abstract

An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.

Keywords

Intrinsic value Internalism Resonance Well-being Moore