Philosophical Studies

, Volume 157, Issue 1, pp 61–76

Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9

Cite this article as:
Schneider, S. Philos Stud (2012) 157: 61. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9


I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.


Property dualismDavid ChalmersJaegwon KimQualiaSubstance dualismSubstanceMindNon-reductive physicalismConsciousnessBundle theorySubstratum theoryPhysicalismMaterialism

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA