Philosophical Studies

, Volume 157, Issue 1, pp 61–76

Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

Authors

    • Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Pennsylvania
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9

Cite this article as:
Schneider, S. Philos Stud (2012) 157: 61. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9618-9

Abstract

I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.

Keywords

Property dualismDavid ChalmersJaegwon KimQualiaSubstance dualismSubstanceMindNon-reductive physicalismConsciousnessBundle theorySubstratum theoryPhysicalismMaterialism

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010