Abstract
Direct theories of the virtues maintain that an explanation of why some virtuous trait counts as valuable should ultimately appeal to the value of its characteristic motive or aim. In this paper I argue that, if we take the idea of a direct approach to virtue theory seriously, we should favour a view according to which virtue involves knowledge. I raise problems for recent “agent-based” and “end-based” versions of the direct approach, show how my account proves preferable to these, and defend it against a number of objections.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
E. Anscombe (1959) Intention Basil Blackwell Oxford, UK
D. Davidson (1980) ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, in Essays on Actions and Events Oxford University Press Oxford, UK
Driver J. (1989). ‘The Virtues of Ignorance’. Journal of Philosophy. 86
J. Driver (1996) ‘The Virtues and Human Nature’ R. Crisp (Eds) How Should One Live?. Oxford University Press Oxford, UK 110–129
Duff R.A. (2003). ‘The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence’. Metaphilosophy 34
G. Gaus (1990) Value and Justification Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK
T. Hurka (2001) Virtue, Vice, and Value Oxford University Press Oxford, UK
R. Hursthouse (1999) On Virtue Ethics Oxford University Press Oxford, UK
Langton R. (2003), ‘Values: Conditioned and Conferred’, MS
Lewis D. (1989). ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, pp. 113–137
J.L. Mackie (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Penguin Books London, UK
A. Millar (2002) ‘Normative Reasons and Instrumental Rationality’ J.L. Bermúdez A. Millar (Eds) Reasons and Nature. Oxford University Press Oxford, UK
Montague P. (1992). ‘Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story’. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 29, No. 1
R. Nozick (1981) Philosophical Explanations Clarendon Press Oxford, UK
T.M. Scanlon (1998) What We Owe to Each Other Harvard University Press Cambridge, USA
M. Slote (1997) ‘Virtue Ethics’ M. Baron P. Pettit M. Slote (Eds) Three Methods of Ethics. Basil Blackwell Oxford, UK 175–238
M. Slote (2001) Morals from Motives Oxford University Press Oxford, UK
M. Smith (1994) The Moral Problem Basil Blackwell Oxford, UK
Swanton C. (1997). ‘Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Indirection: A Pluralistic Value-Centred Approach’, Utilitas 9. (No. 2)
Trianosky G. (1987). ‘Virtue, Action, and the Good Life’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68
J.D. Velleman (1992) ArticleTitle‘The Guise of the Good’ Nous. 26 3–26
J.D. Velleman (2000) ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’ In: The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford University Press Oxford, UK 170–199
Watson G. (1990). ‘On the Primacy of Character’. In: Flanagan O., Rorty A. (ed). Identity, Character, and Morality. MIT Press, pp. 449–469
L. Zagzebski (1996) Virtues of the Mind Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brady, M.S. The Value of the Virtues. Philos Stud 125, 85–113 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7788-7
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7788-7